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Security vulnerabilities can represent enormous risks to society and business organizations. 
A large percentage of vulnerabilities in software are discovered by individuals external to the 
developing organization. These vulnerabilities are often exchanged for monetary rewards or a 
negotiated selling price, giving rise to vulnerability markets. Some of these markets are 
regulated, while some are unregulated. Many buyers in the unregulated markets include 
individuals, groups, or government organizations who intend to use the vulnerabilities for 
potential attacks. Vulnerabilities traded through such markets can cause great economic, 
organizational, and national security risks. Vulnerability markets can reduce risks if the 
vulnerabilities are acquitted and remedied by the software developers. Studying vulnerability 
markets and their related issues will provide an insight into their underlying mechanisms, which 
can be used to assess the risks and develop approaches for reducing and mitigating the potential 
risks to enhance the security against the data breaches.  
Some of the aspects of vulnerability—discovery, dissemination, and disclosure—have 
received some recent attention. However, the role of interaction among the vulnerability 
discoverers and vulnerability acquirers has not yet been adequately addressed. This dissertation 
suggests that a major fraction of discoverers, a majority in some cases, are unaffiliated with the 
software developers and thus are free to disseminate the vulnerabilities they discover in any way 





discovery literature, the vulnerability discoverers have remained anonymous. Although there has 
been an attempt to model the level of their efforts, information regarding their identities, modes 
of operation, and what they are doing with the discovered vulnerabilities has not been explored.  
Reports of buying and selling the vulnerabilities are now appearing in the press; however, 
the nature of the actual vulnerability markets needs to be analyzed. We have attempted to collect 
detailed information. We have identified the most prolific vulnerability discoverers throughout 
the past decade and examined their motivation and methods. A large percentage of these 
discoverers are located outside of the US. We have contacted several of the most prolific 
discoverers in order to collect firsthand information regarding their techniques, motivations, and 
involvement in the vulnerability markets. We examine why many of the discoverers appear to 
retire after a highly successful vulnerability-finding career. We found that the discoverers had 
enough experience and good reputation to work officially with a good salary in some well-
known software development companies.  
Many security breaches have been reported in the past few years, impacting both large and 
small organizations. Such breaches may occur through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. 
There has been considerable disagreement about the overall cost and probability of such 
breaches. No significant formal studies have yet addressed this issue of risk assessment, though 
some proprietary approaches for evaluating partial data breach costs and probabilities have been 
implemented. These approaches have not been formally evaluated or compared and have not 
been systematically optimized. This study proposes a consolidated approach for identifying key 
factors contributing to the breach cost by minimizing redundancy among the factors. Existing 
approaches have been evaluated using the data from some of the well-documented breaches. It is 





examined and the need for better models is identified. A complete computational model for 
estimating the costs and probabilities of data breaches for a given organization has been 
developed. We consider both the fixed and variable costs and the economy of scale.  Assessing 
the impact of data breaches will allow organizations to assess the risks due to potential breaches 
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The potential exploitation of software security vulnerabilities has emerged as a major 
security threat to organizations, some economic sectors, and national defense. A software 
vulnerability can be defined as a software defect or a weakness in a security system that could be 
exploited by a malicious user, causing loss or harm [1]. A vulnerability exploit is a code that 
exploits a vulnerability and serves as proof that the vulnerability is indeed exploitable. A 
vulnerability that has not been disclosed and its associated exploit are often termed a “zero-day”. 
A patch, when applied, can remedy a vulnerability. The number of unremedied vulnerabilities in 
a system represents the degree of security risk. During the software lifecycle development 
process, it is important to evaluate and manage this risk in order to assess how it will impact 
users, organizations, and society.  
The vulnerabilities are traded or exchanged in vulnerability markets. These markets may be 
classified as regulated, in which the transactions are properly recorded and disclosed; black, in 
which the transactions are not disclosed and there is no attempt to safeguard society; or gray, in 
which the transactions can be either termed legitimate or improper depending on one’s point of 
view. In the regulated markets, the buyers are the original software developers, third-party 
security service organizations follow proper practices when disclosing the vulnerabilities, and the 
transactions are well-documented [2, 3]. Recent reports suggest that government agencies in 
several countries have become major players in the gray markets [4], and thus, there has been a 
remarkable change in the vulnerability markets.  
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However, the vulnerability markets have a huge impact on economics and security of 
organizations and governments. This impact comes from security data breaches. The risk of 
compromising the confidentiality of records has increased with the increasing trend of businesses 
collecting, storing, and transmitting financial and personal information in electronic form. A data 
breach incident refers to malicious data disclosure to unauthorized parties [5]. Such breaches 
occur for different reasons. The hackers’ intent is often to steal data for financial gain, but they 
may also intend to harm individuals or organizations by disclosing their confidential information 
or intellectual property. In the past few years there have been several well-publicized data 
breaches. In spite of significant effort by government agencies, those involved in such 
cybercrimes are often caught only after a long period of activity, and some are never caught. The 
potential victims of such crime thus have the burden of assessing their risk and investing in 
countermeasures. 
The study of vulnerability markets, their main players, and the risk presented by those 
markets are interesting and essential, including the issue of lost or stolen data via data breaches 
by the exploitation of vulnerabilities. The subject is especially compelling, considering few 
academic researchers have tried to explore this area and no academic group, for example, has 
constructed a systematic model to estimate data breach risks, including the cost and probability 
of data breaches. Both vulnerability markets and data breach risks are main issues in 
software/website industries in terms of the data security concept and its impact on economies and 
societies.  
1.1 The Dissertation Objective 
The current situation of the vulnerability markets encourages discoverers to sell their 
vulnerabilities in illegitimate markets instead of legitimate markets because the large monetary 
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rewards are attractive to them. Furthermore, some people or groups who have special agendas 
buy vulnerabilities to harm others. This situation generates many security risks, such as data 
breaches, and these can cost a great deal of money. Therefore, studying the types of discoverers 
and consumers and their motivations, vulnerability markets and the money flow, and making a 
consolidate model to estimate the data breach risk will support the goal of reducing the security 
risks by improving security awareness for all people who has related to software vulnerability. 
As the result, the legitimate markets should be more attractive for vulnerability discoverers, who 
might otherwise resort to selling their findings on the black market, and software developers 
should be ready to any data breach especially they can estimate the data breach cost and 
probability and this is important since the security mistake will cost their organizations a lot of 
effort and loss business.  
However, the topic of vulnerability markets is huge, and it is related to other overlapping 
areas, such as software quality, risk management, software engineering, security measurement, 
and economics. Therefore, the motivation of the dissertation will be diverse. The dissertation 
focus on the three major directions, which are as the follows:   
• Analysis and organize the vulnerability markets: 
As we mentioned before, the vulnerability markets could lead to some security risks in the 
form of lost information and economic risks in the form of data breach costs or damage costs if a 
vulnerability is sold to disreputable people, organizations, or governments who attempt to harm 
others to further their own agendas. Therefore, analyzing the types that vulnerabilities 
discoverers can sell is very important. In addition, knowing how the money flows through those 
markets and how those markets interact with the vulnerability lifecycle is crucial to 
understanding these markets. Studying the markets from the inside will assist in organizing them 
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and making some markets more attractive than others. This will also reduce security risks, which 
is one of our main goals of this dissertation.  
• Analysis the main players in the vulnerability markets and their motivations: 
Studying the types of vulnerability discoverers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) will help us 
to identify the kinds of people who are interested in vulnerabilities. Moreover, every player in 
the markets has different motivations that led him or her to choose a specific vulnerability 
market in which to buy or sell vulnerabilities. This means that responsible buyers, such as 
software vendors, can create rewards to attract certain discoverers, depending on the discoverers’ 
motivations. This will create new interest in certain less-attractive markets. Therefore, the 
transactions in illegitimate markets will be reduced. Then, the security and economic risks will 
be reduced as well.   
• Investigating the consequences of the misuse of the vulnerability markets: 
Usually, if the owners of a software program or computer system know the risks of 
vulnerability exploitation in terms of their reputation, information, security, and economic worth, 
they will focus on all possible causes of such risks. Therefore, studying academically the factors 
that affect the direct or indirect of data breach costs and making a consolidate and systematic 
model to estimate and predict the cost and probability of data breach will encourage software 
owners to find solutions for the key issues in the vulnerability markets.   
1.2. The dissertation’s Contributions 
In this dissertation, we obtain some data for analysis and then identify the research 
objectives by using various approaches, such as direct surveys, using the current dataset, and 
collecting additional data manually. These approaches assist us in studying the software 
vulnerability markets and the main players in those markets, and estimating the data breach risks.  
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We investigate the types of vulnerability markets and their classifications, types of 
vulnerability discoverers and consumers and their motivations for selling or buying the 
vulnerability, and monetary flow between discoverers and consumers during vulnerability 
markets. We found that there are four different classifications for the current software 
vulnerability markets: producers (vulnerability discoverers types), vulnerability markets types 
(Regulated markets, online forum, gray markets, black markets), consumers (buyers of 
vulnerability), and the buying reasons such as attacking other organization or patching the 
vulnerability. In addition, we found that major vulnerability discoverers are individuals from 
external the software development organizations and their main motivation for discovery is 
financial rewards and this result comes from direct questions that when we ask them about their 
motivation in addition to other questions.  
For the security data breach risks, we study the existing approaches for calculating the cost 
of data security, we identified and examined the existing data breach cost calculators that are 
available online. We collect the factors that impact the cost and probability for each calculator. 
Then, we choose the significant factors and remove the insignificant factors depending on 
scientific approach.  
After we collect sufficient actual data regarding significant factors that affect the cost and 
probability of data breaches, and we know how every calculator computes the cost or probability 
of a data breach. Subsequently, we make a consolidated, systematic model to estimate the cost 
and probability of a data breach.  
1.3. Dissertation Structure  
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides some background concepts 
and related work to aid the reader in understanding the main topic and all its major branches. 
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Chapter 3 presents the results for the analysis of vulnerability markets, as well as important 
information related directly to these markets, such as their money flow. Chapter 4 shows the 
methods and motivations of the main players of the vulnerability markets, especially the 
vulnerabilities’ discoverers, who are considered the main reason for launching those markets. 
The consolidated factors approach for estimating data breach costs is demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
In addition, a quantitative risk assessment model of a data security breach is presented in Chapter 
6, and it includes the data breach cost and probability. Finally, Chapter 7 presents research 
challenges, possibilities for future work, and a conclusion.  
1.4 Publication History 
Most of the results that have already been obtained through experiments in this dissertation 
have been published in peer-reviewed conferences [6, 7] and a journal [8]. Some of these 

















In this section, some of the background concepts and terminology are discussed in order to 
understand the problem at hand and the approaches that appear later in this dissertation. In 
addition, related work is mentioned to know what other researchers did and to illustrate what this 
research contributes to this topic.  
2.1 Fundamental vulnerability markets and security terms 
Many concepts in vulnerability markets are essential to explain in this dissertation. 
Following are basic security and economics terms that are related to vulnerability markets. 
• 0-day vulnerability: it likes a normal vulnerability (hole in a software), but it is 
unknown to vendor. Thus, the attacker can exploit the vulnerability before patching it 
[9].  Zero-vulnerability or normal vulnerability are both significant in the 
vulnerability markets, but any zero-vulnerability should be more expensive in the 
markets because it is unknown and this leads to unexpected attack (0-day attack or 
exploit).  
• Vulnerability Markets: “where security-related information can be traded” [10]. 
• Vulnerability Discoverer: This is an individual who or an organization such as a 
vendor, independent researcher, cyber-criminal, or government agency that discovers 
a new vulnerability [11]. The discoverer could sell the discovered vulnerability to 
other.  
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• Hacker: This is an entity that releases exploits for the vulnerabilities in the products 
of software [12]. There are three different types of hacker (exploiter): White, gray, 
and black hat.  
• Attack: An attacker needs to exploit at least one vulnerability in the system to reach 
to his aim [13]. 
• 0-Day Attack (Exploit): This is a cyber-attack exploiting a vulnerability that has not 
been disclosed publically [14].  
• Threat: The likelihood or frequency of a harmful event occurring [15]. 
• Bug Broker: “an authorized negotiator that acts on behalf of society in order to 
increase transparency of the bug bounty process” [16]. This is in vulnerability 
rewards programs, but the broker usually found in the gray/black markets to sell and 
buy vulnerability to people who are interested in vulnerabilities trade. 
• Severity: This is calculated by a risk score that assigned by CVSS and indicates the 
size of the risk associated with a vulnerability [15].  
• Reward for Vulnerability Discoverer: “It provide an incentive for security 
researchers not to sell their research results to malicious actors in the underground 
economy or the gray world of vulnerability markets” [17]. Usually the reward 
provides in legitimate markets and depends on the severity of the vulnerability, but in 
other markets, it calls vulnerability price.  
• Full Disclosure: This is a security philosophy that holds that the details of security 
vulnerabilities should be available to everyone in a timely fashion [11].   
• Patch Release Time: The number of days elapsed between the vendor notification 
date and the patch release date [18]  
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• 0-Day Patch: This is a patch where the vulnerability is disclosed the same day the 
patch is released by the vendor [19].  
2.2 Vulnerability lifecycle phases  
 
Figure 2.1: Lifecycle of Vulnerability [19] 
Arbaugh et al. [20], Marconato et al. [21], Frei et al. [22], and Okamura et al. [23], 
demonstrated the lifecycle model that describes the states of a vulnerability over its lifetime (see 
Figure 2.1). The lifecycle is separated by distinctive points in time that divide the lifecycle of 
vulnerability into phases, where each of them reflects a state and an associated risk [20]. Thus, 
the term vulnerability lifecycle implies the fixed and linear progression from one phase to 
another phase, to understand the behavior of vulnerabilities. All possible states of vulnerability 
were addressed as follows:  
• Birth: This denotes the creation of a software flaw or defect. 
• Discovery: Discover of the vulnerability in the software product. The vulnerability 
discoverers could be black hat or white hat. 
• Disclosure: The discoverers can expose the vulnerability details to the developer, the 
public or to a wide audience. 
• Correction (Patching): Correct the vulnerability by releasing a software 
modification through the software vendors or developers.  
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• Publicity: A vulnerability becomes public in any of several ways. 
• Scripting (Exploitation): A new vulnerability is successfully exploited by someone 
with moderate skills. 
• Death: When the vulnerability is patched or the attackers are no longer interested in 
it.  
Studying vulnerability lifecycles can support the development, deployment, and 
maintenance of software systems in designing future security policies and conducting audits of 
past incidents. This also leads to assessment of the security risks in software products of different 
vendors [12]. The sequence of exploit, disclosure, and patch is not always fixed [22] because 
sometimes the exploit and the patch can be before, at, or after the discovery state.  
2.3 Vulnerability databases 
There are several vulnerability databases organized by government-affiliated or private 
organizations. These include the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [24], Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [25], the vulnerability data collected by Frei et al. [12] 
(FVDB), Exploit Database, and IBM X-Force Vulnerability Database. NVD provides 
information about exploitation requirements and consequences, while OSVDB provide solution 
types available for a particular vulnerability [26]. CVE stands for Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures [27], which is a list of standardized names for vulnerabilities and information security 
exposures. A CVE-number indicates a standardized identifier for known vulnerabilities.  
2.4 Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) 
CVSS is a specification for measuring the relative severity of software vulnerability [15]. It 




Figure 2.2: The CVSS Metric Groups [15] 
• Base metrics are vulnerability attributes that are constant over time and across all 
implementations and environments.  
• Temporal metrics are vulnerability attributes that change over time but apply to all 
instances of a vulnerability in all environments such as the public availability of 
exploit code or remediation techniques. The temporal vulnerability score is calculated 
with an equation that uses the score of both base and temporal metrics as parameters.  
• Environmental metrics are also vulnerability attributes that are organization- and 
implementation-specific, such as how prevalent a target is within an organization. 
The environment score is calculated with an equation that uses the score of both 
temporal and environmental metrics as parameters.  
The vulnerability severity is measured by CVSS metrics that target vulnerability 
exploitation and prioritize the mitigation of new vulnerabilities. The severity rankings include 
Low (0.0 to 3.9), Medium (4.0 to 6.9) and High (7.0 to 10.0).   
2.5 Vulnerability security impact  
The chances of loss of information and records have increased with increases in personal 
information for most people being collected, stored and transmitted by businesses in electronic 
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form. Data breach incidents caused by malicious hacking can exploit some software 
vulnerabilities and harm people or organizations by breaching some data, and this can lead to 
harassment, embarrassment, impersonation or theft. 
2.6 Economic costs (impact) of data breaches 
The cybercrimes that occur following data breaches and the impact of these crimes on the 
economy in terms of damage and cost can be enormous. In many cases, the damages to 
individual organizations have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Some costs 
are not easily measurable, such as impact on segments of the economy or national security. 
2.7 Related work 
There are several academic references that discuss vulnerability markets. Most are 
preliminary works that attempt to study those markets, describe the highlights, and identify the 
main players that affect them. These references did not provide enough information or sufficient 
explanations as to how vulnerability markets are comprehensively classified or how the main 
players interact with them. In addition, another question remains: how does money flow between 
players and through the markets and what is the data breach impact for the organization that face 
a breach.  The main difference between our research and others’ research is that ours is specific 
and comprehensive: it concerns all vulnerability market classifications, the main types of players 
and their motivations, and the flow of money, which is the main fuel that drives these markets. 
Furthermore, we study the actual vulnerability markets rather than hypothetical markets, which 
have often been used in recent literature. In addition, how the cost and probability of security 
data breach are calculating for the breached organizations. However, the related work here will 
be divide into four parts: all vulnerability markets in general, a specific vulnerability market 
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(black market), another specific vulnerability market (vulnerability rewards programs), and data 
breach risk (include data breach cost).   
2.7.1 Vulnerability markets 
Fully-fledged vulnerability markets appeared in 2002, whereas the initial full disclosure 
movement began in the 1990s [3]. Schechter proposes a vulnerability market in which the 
software vendors can provide some rewards for the vulnerability finders (testers) in their 
products [28]. These markets can be used to improve the product’s security. A first step in 
creating a mechanism for vulnerability markets to increase the system’s security was introduced 
by Camp and Wolfram [29]. They confirm that governments can make the system more secure 
when they issue some incentive for vulnerabilities.  
Examination of the vulnerability disclosure mechanisms is essential to know which 
mechanism has a better impact on the software security in the end. For instance, Kannan and 
Telang [30] made an initial and simple structure model of vulnerability disclosure mechanisms 
that include the vulnerability markets mechanism and the competition between benign users and 
hackers during the vulnerability discovery phase to analyze the impact of monetary incentives, 
which are provided by some organizations (see Figure 2.3). That model has four main 
participants including the infomediary (such as iDefense or CERT), the discoverers, who are 
either benign or malicious, and the software users. The vulnerability markets are unregulated if 
the infomediary leaks vulnerability information. Otherwise, the markets are regulated. The 
authors of this paper present an early mathematical study of vulnerability markets and compute 
the user loss probability of each case of the security attacks on the software users and the welfare 
probability of obtaining of incentives for vulnerability reporters (identifiers) and the subscription 
fees between software users and the infomediary. For example, when the infomediary receives 
the information from identifiers, it will use that information to protect only the users who 
14		
subscribe to the infomediary’s service. The main difference between the CERT mechanism and a 
market-based mechanism is the second mechanism provides monetary rewards to vulnerability 
reporters when they submit a vulnerability. They come to the conclusion that a federally 
controlled mechanism such as CERT would benefit society more than an unregulated market-
based mechanism as implemented by iDefense because the disclosure rules of the private 
vulnerability markets are socially suboptimal. In contrast, a regulated market-based mechanism 
is better than the CERT mechanism under some conditions.  
 
Figure 2.3: General Structure Model of Vulnerability Disclosure [30] 
In addition, Ransbotham et al. [31] examine market-based vulnerability disclosure 
mechanisms’ effectiveness through an empirical examination of two years of security alert data. 
Figure 2.4 shows the primary pathways to public disclosure of software vulnerability including 
immediate disclosure by security professionals such as security mailing lists (BugTraq), 
nonpublic disclosure like CERT, which immediately notifies the vendor and then discloses the 
vulnerability to the public (usually 45 days after notifying vendors) when the patch is available, 
market disclosure such as IDefense and ZDI which can sell the vulnerability through these 
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markets by security professionals. However, attackers always use one pathway to sell their 
discovered vulnerability into black markets, which leads to direct exploitation. As a result of 
studying those mechanisms, the authors determined that market-based disclosure controls 
vulnerability exploitation diffusion; this reduces the exploitation risk and the number of 
exploitation attempts.   
 
Figure 2.4: Vulnerability Disclosure Pathways [31] 
One of the oldest economic concepts is selling the vulnerability in auction. Therefore, 
McKinney [3] briefly discusses vulnerability commoditization in software industries and other 
elements that are related to the vulnerability bazaar (i.e. an auction) such as the main players who 
deal with markets, gray markets, and vulnerability auctions. Furthermore, Ozment [32] describes 
auctions as having the best design for understanding vulnerability markets to improve defense 
plan against security attacks. He uses economic concepts of auctions, such as auctions beginning 
at low prices and then rising in price until bids are accepted by sellers. The vulnerability 
auctions’ concept like WabiSabiLabi has disappeared since 2007 [33], because the buyers of the 
vulnerabilities are frequently suspects who can harm others and this is against the law in most 
countries. 
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Another economic concept used to trade vulnerabilities is the vulnerability market. Some 
researchers have focused on that type of market. Miller discusses the zero-day legitimate markets 
in terms of the problems of 2005—such as the lack of transparency in pricing of vulnerability 
and the difficulty of finding sellers and buyers in legitimate markets, since these markets are not 
attractive for some reasons—which are almost identical to our current issues [2]. He also 
suggests possible solutions, like trying to find direct auctions or trusted third parties to attempt 
the sale of zero-day exploits as legitimate incomes for both sellers and buyers of vulnerability, as 
described in two case studies.  There was no actual implementation.  
Finally, Böhme discusses the advantages and disadvantages of five different types of 
vulnerability markets to find the best market type by comparing criteria such as information, 
incentives, risk balancing, and efficiency [10]. These criteria were important during his studies 
on economic values concerning zero-day exploits in computer security. Vulnerability finders can 
sell their vulnerabilities into thriving markets such as some big security companies like iDefense 
and ZDI. 
2.7.2. Black markets 
Other literature has focused on specific markets or used markets to obtain specific results. 
For instance, Radianti and Gonzalez [34] explain the features of vulnerability and the issues of 
black markets by proposing a preliminary model that demonstrates the factors that affect specific 
vulnerability markets such as black markets and how software vulnerability has been mitigated. 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the vulnerability discovery flow into legal markets or black markets. 
After that, the authors have built many sub-models for the black markets and the main players 
such as sellers and buyers. 
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Figure 2.5: Vulnerability Discovery Flows and Simplification in System Dynamic Model [34] 
Moreover, Radianti et al. [35] have continuously focused on the vulnerability of the black 
market and its development as a marketplace for selling or buying exploits by malicious hackers 
or others. These authors proposed a dynamic model to capture the structure of vulnerability, as 
discovered through black and white markets, and to examine the successful and unsuccessful 
factors of those markets in order to prevent further developments in black markets. Radianti et al. 
proposed five main sectors including the following (see Figure 2.6): chain of vulnerability sector, 
exploits sector, black market sector, security researchers sector, and payment sector. The chain 
of vulnerability and exploits sectors affect each other since the exploits lifetime to some extent 
depends on the secrecy of the vulnerabilities. Otherwise, vulnerabilities are repeatedly detected 
from the circulated exploit. Exploit identifications sometimes spark exploit trading in the black 
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markets. The security researchers sector includes people who are able to discover vulnerabilities 
or establish exploits, viruses, and other malware, and consists of different groups: black hat 
hackers in the black market, white hat researcher volunteers, and the black hat and white hat 
researchers in legitimate markets. The legitimate and black markets are mostly very attractive for 
the security researchers due to monetary incentives. This last is captured in the payment sector.  
 
Figure 2.6: Main Sectors in a Vulnerability Black Market Model [35] 
However, Allodi et al. [36] tried to answer several questions: Are black markets relevant for 
final user security, and does it make sense to use vulnerability information from the black 
markets to design patching policies? To accomplish this, they utilized two steps: first, they 
checked for the relevance of exploit kits’ vulnerabilities in the general attack scenario, and 
second, they developed a model to estimate the reduction in risk using a typical CVSS-based 
strategy and a black market-based strategy. The authors mainly used data on vulnerabilities 
traded in the black markets that they collected themselves, and real attack data as reported by 
Symantec’s WINE data-sharing program. After this was complete, they classified the 
information into several categories to allow assessment of confounding influences on the 
probability of vulnerabilities exploitation. Their preliminary observations showed that the 
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vulnerability risk score (CVSS) versus attacks performs well, but it leaves 40% of the attacks 
uncovered. Conversely, the vulnerabilities in exploit kits drive between 10% and 40% of attacks 
received by the final users. Therefore, cyber-crime black markets are an important source of risk 
for final users. Active and efficient monitoring of the markets may lead to more efficient 
patching strategies. In addition, the efficacy of patching strategies seems to vary with the 
category of the vulnerable software, so there may be a need for ad hoc policies for different 
software products.  
2.7.3 Vulnerability rewards programs 
Remediation strategies are very useful to reduce the impact of loss of information. One of 
these strategies is vulnerability rewards programs. Therefore, providing rewards to motivate 
people to find software defects or weaknesses before they are exploited by black hat exploiters is 
critical to improving computer security. There are only a few current vulnerability reward 
programs, and most of them were created a few years ago. The idea of reward programs is still 
quite new, and needs more development and improvement. Currently, many companies have 
rewards programs that provide a reward for software discoverers who discover a defect or flaw 
in software. A few vendors, like Adobe and Oracle, do not have their own VRPs because they 
argue that these rewards programs do not represent the best return on investment on a per-bug 
basis. Finifter et al. [17] examine the features and characteristics of two well-known 
vulnerability rewards programs (VRPs) from 2009 to 2012. Those two programs appear to be 
two to one hundred times more cost-efficient than hiring expert security researchers to find 
vulnerabilities. The authors recommended that software vendors focus on three important points 
to make their VRPs successful. First, the rewards for participants should follow a tiered 
structure, such as is used in Chrome, where participants who submit critical vulnerabilities 
receive a high amount and those who submit low-impact vulnerabilities receive a low amount. In 
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addition, the high variance in patch release time for critical vulnerabilities in Firefox could 
negatively affect the security community, since participation would reduce responsibility through 
the vulnerability rewards programs. The third factor, providing high rewards for interesting 
vulnerabilities, such as Chrome’s rewards, will encourage participants to apply to the VRPs.  
2.7.4 The risk of security data breaches 
The potential risks that appear after the exploitation of a vulnerability should be discussed 
with and published to raise awareness for the public and specialists. For example, cybercrime is 
estimated to have lost the global economy around US $445 billion in 2014 [37]. The costs of 
those breaches could be the main way to call organizations’ attention to security risks to 
vulnerability markets. Few academic groups focus on analysis and study data breach risks in 
terms of cost or probability. Layton and Waters [38] estimated the tangible costs of data breaches 
using two case studies (Telstra and LinkedIn), focusing on a salary guide and rough estimation of 
the work hours of the people who were involved to manage the data breach. They estimate labor 
costs, regarding them as the only tangible cost. In terms of intangible costs, Layton and Waters 
only consider the loss of reputation. It is interesting to note that they argue that the stock price 
was not negatively impacted after announcement of data breach in the two cases considered. The 














The vulnerability discoverers represent a critical source of security risk, should they choose 
to sell the vulnerability to malicious organizations or individuals. A vulnerability sold to the 
developing organization [39] results in a patch that minimizes the risk. However, a vulnerability 
could also be sold to an organization interested in using it for exploitation. Reports suggest that 
some exploitable vulnerabilities can command market prices exceeding $100,000[40, 41]. 
This study examines real vulnerability markets as they exist. In a market, a commodity (here 
an undisclosed vulnerability) is made by the producers, and is bought by the consumers or 
resellers of the commodity. The price is determined by supply and demand. A market may be 
regulated to some extent or it may be largely unregulated. The presence of a market itself 
enhances the level of production and consumption. Kannan and Telang [30] present an early 
mathematical study of the vulnerabilities market, where the discoverers are either benign or 
malicious, and come to the conclusion that a federally controlled mechanism would be better for 
society. As we present here, the real markets that have emerged are more complex and are 
international in nature. 
As we discuss below, a large percentage of vulnerabilities are found by experts external to 
the actual software development organizations. They are free to disclose the vulnerabilities that 
they discover in any way they like. The hackers who are vulnerability exploiters are often 
classified as white hat, black hat, and gray hat [42, 43]. These classifications do not apply to the 
vulnerability discoverers who are security researchers engaged in finding vulnerabilities since 
they may choose different markets for different vulnerabilities. Also note that, in general, the 
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exploiters and the discoverers are distinct groups. Discovering vulnerabilities is not an illegal or 
anti-social activity, it is a respectable profession; whereas exploiting vulnerabilities is generally 
the opposite (unless it is part of a service). 
The vulnerability markets, as shown in (Figure 3.1), may be classified as regulated, where 
the transactions are properly recorded and disclosed; black, where the transactions are not 
disclosed and there is no attempt to safeguard the society; or gray, where the transactions can be 
termed legitimate or improper, depending on the point of view. In the regulated markets the 
buyers are original software developers, third-party security service organizations follow proper 
practices for disclosing the vulnerabilities, and the transactions are well-documented [2, 3]. 
 
Figure 3.1: The current software vulnerability markets 
 
The current software vulnerability reward programs are a major part of the legitimate 
markets that attempt to attract the vulnerability discoverers who might otherwise resort to selling 
their findings on the black market. These programs are relatively new and sometimes limited. 
They attempt to bring a discovery to the legitimate market, which significantly reduces the risk 
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to society. Some government agencies in some countries are becoming main buyers of software 
vulnerability.  
3.2 Vulnerability Markets and the Main Players 
Vulnerability discoverers can be internal or external to a software development 
organization. They seek appropriate rewards for their capabilities. The external vulnerability 
finders (freelancers) are often free to offer their discovery in exchange for a suitable reward. 
They may attempt to maximize their reward by selling vulnerabilities in the appropriate 
vulnerabilities markets [30, 44].  
In an ideal situation, the discoverers seek no reward and submit the vulnerabilities found to 
a responsible disclosure mechanism. Receiving credit for a vulnerability discovered is sufficient 
compensation for some. However, it is not enough for many discoverers. They know that 
vulnerabilities can have significant economic value [10] because they can lead to zero-day 
exploits that might harm organizations, the economy, and ultimately, society [45]. Some exploits 
have sold for as much as $250,000 [46]. In addition to money, some discoverers find the fame 
generated by the disclosure attractive, as it can translate into further economic opportunities. 
Some organizations, such as Google, have acknowledged the importance of freelance 
discoverers, and offer a significant monetary award in addition to the possible inclusion in their 
‘discoverers hall of fame’. A good example of a vulnerability discoverer who has taken 
advantage of such a reward program is Sergey Glazunov, a Russian student and security 
researcher who earned $60,000 by discovering a new exploit in Google’s Chrome browser [47]. 
Generally, finding vulnerability exploits is legal, and some legitimate businesses sell them. The 
price for an exploit sold to business and government agencies in the United States ranges from 
$20,000 to more than $250,000 [48]. Each market has some attributes that are more attractive for 
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some producers (discoverers) and consumers (buyers) based on their long and short term 
objectives. A market is defined by its governing rules and conventions. The transactions between 
discoverers and buyers (software venders, those with malicious intentions, or resellers) involve 
an exchange of vulnerability information for a suitable price, generally money. The buyers of 
vulnerabilities derive the value by making their software product safer, or by the rewards a zero-
day attack may bring. Below we discuss each of the markets. 
3.2.1 Regulated Vulnerability Market 
This is a regulated market that is controlled by conventions and laws that attempt to prevent 
any improper actions towards the society as a whole. It includes the four markets discussed 
below. In all of these markets the vulnerability information is transferred to the software venders, 
who then patch the vulnerability in their products before it is disclosed. 
3.2.1.1 Publicity 
In this case, the discoverer submits the finding to an authority, where it undergoes a well-
defined responsible disclosure procedure. The discoverer gets the recognition and the software 
developer gets the chance to develop a patch before the vulnerability is disclosed. The publicity 
generated may enhance a discoverer’s reputation as a capable researcher. CERT and other 
similar organizations provide such a market. This market would not be attractive for discoverers 
who have already established themselves or who need money more than publicity. For some, the 
recognition received may eventually translate into economic opportunities. 
3.2.1.2 Captive Market 
In this market the discoverers are captive to an organization and are thus not permitted to 
reveal the vulnerabilities externally. This includes vulnerability finders working within a 
software development organization or those working for them under contracts. Researchers 
within security service organizations are also, in effect, captive. In some countries the 
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government may be the only permitted buyer, although in that case the government is free to use 
the vulnerability based on its national priorities. 
3.2.1.3 Vulnerability Rewards by Vendors 
The reward programs offered by software venders are a good option for vulnerability 
discoverers who can sell their finding to the venders directly in an easy, legitimate way. The 
reward offered for a vulnerability can be significant, although modest in most cases. In addition, 
the discoverers receive appropriate credit [32]. 
Rewarding security researchers and others who make software products more secure is 
important. Providing rewards to motivate people to find software defects or weaknesses before 
they are exploited by black hat exploiters is critical to improve computer security. 
There are only a few current vulnerability reward programs, and most of them were created 
a few years ago. The idea of reward programs is still quite new, and needs more development 
and improvement.  
The current reward programs include these listed below. The key information about them is 
provided in (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Some current vulnerability rewards programs 
 
• Vulnerability Reward Program for Google web properties [49]: This program was created 
in November 2010. People who discover one of five types of vulnerabilities, such as remote code 
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execution, SQL injection, and other common web flaws, are rewarded $100 to $20,000. The 
number of discoverers who have received approval from the reward panel has ranged between 53 
winners in the fourth quarter of 2010 to 39 winners in the fourth quarter of 2012. 
• Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program (Chromium Security Reward) [50]: All 
vulnerabilities are considered in this program, provided the vulnerability is identified as being of 
sufficiently high severity. The rewards range from $500 to $10,000 and up.  
• The Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program [51]: The rewards range from $500 to $3,000 
depending on the severity rating of the vulnerability, and the reward includes a Mozilla t-shirt.  
• Facebook [52]: This program is similar to most other reward programs. It offers a bounty 
for certain qualifying security bugs. The reward has a minimum of $500 with no specified 
maximum, and is based on severity and creativity.  
• WordPress Security Bug Bounty Program [53]: This program has two different bounties: 
one for WordPress and another for WordPress Plugins. The minimum reward is $25, and the 
maximum reward is $1,000.  
• CCBill Vulnerability Reward Program [54]: CCBill is an Internet billing service. The 
rewards range from $300 to $500, depending on the types of vulnerabilities found, such as SQL 
Injection, DoS, and persistent XSS.This program has been temporarily placed on hold due to 
corrections needed in the reported bugs. 
Eventually, Microsoft has announced last June 2013 a month-long vulnerability rewards 
programs for the Internet Explorer (IE11) developer preview [55]. Microsoft was not interested 
in paying rewards programs since it does use outside consultant organizations to test their 
software on a contract basis, however [56]. 
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3.2.1.4 Rewards by Security Service Companies 
Some companies that provide security services also acquire vulnerabilities. The 
vulnerabilities acquired are used to provide a higher degree of safety to their security customers, 
and may be provided to the software developer using a suitable compensation mechanism. These 
organizations do not sell the vulnerabilities to others. For example, Microsoft patched at least 17 
vulnerabilities reported by the two programs in 2006 [40]. There are some third-party security 
companies that buy the vulnerabilities and sell them to software makers or vendors such as ZDI 
and iDefense [57]. Such reward programs include the following: 
• Secunia Vulnerability Coordination Reward Program (SVCRP) [58]: There are 
two special awards: most valued contributor and most interesting coordination report. 
• ZDI Rewards Program [59]: The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) provides reward 
points each time a vulnerability submission is purchased. These points determine the ZDI 
status, which are bronze, silver, gold, platinum, and diamond. The rewards range from 
$1,000 to $25,000. 
• iDefense Vulnerability Contributor Program: This is one of the oldest reward 
programs, and a few top discoverers mention working with iDefense. Detailed reward 
information is not available. 
The security service companies may have their own internal vulnerability researchers. Their 
discoveries primarily serve to promote the organization. 
3.2.2 Vulnerability Brokers 
As opposed to the security services companies, vulnerability brokers buy as well as sell 
vulnerabilities. They come closest to an open market, since buyers and sellers can negotiate their 
prices [60, 61]. It is considered a legitimate, but only partially regulated, market that has some 
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general rules. A vulnerability broker is an organization or person who provides a link between a 
vulnerability discoverer and the highest bidder. It has been reported that the commission might 
reach up to 15% of the selling price [57]. Therefore, the broker may sell that information to the 
software venders or to some government organization, depending on who can pay more. Several 
international government organizations are said to have become significant buyers [46] in recent 
years, but their policies are not generally disclosed. 
Vupen, located in France, is an example. They can sell vulnerabilities to a government, 
provided that the government belongs to NATO, ANZUS, or ASEAN alliances [57]. If the 
software venders buy the vulnerability information, they will use it to patch their products, but if 
it is purchased by a government agency [62], they might use it for military purposes, to inflict 
damage to an opponent as a cyber-weapon, or to collect sensitive information (espionage) from 
opposing governments or organizations. Security experts have claimed that the Stuxnet malware 
was specifically created by government agencies in the United States and Israel to attack Iran's 
nuclear facilities in 2010 [63]. We can regard the vulnerability brokers to be a gray market, 
which can be legitimate from the point of view of national priorities. However, considering the 
amount of funding that governments can bring to the table, such markets will reduce the number 
of public disclosures [64]. “The Grugq” a Bangkok-based security researcher, is regarded as an 
influential global vulnerability broker. He arranges deals between vulnerability discoverers and 
western government agencies for a 15% commission [41]. A vulnerability auction site 
WabiSabiLabi was active a few years ago [33].  
3.2.3 Online Forums 
Online forums exist where information about vulnerabilities and exploits can be exchanged. 
In some cases, the exchange may not involve money—rather, the members (called hacktivists) 
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have a special or private agenda to attack specific organizations. LulzSec was a famous 
hacktivist group that attacked several user accounts and websites in different countries in 2011. 
Anonymous is a loosely connected network of hacktivists located in different places that choose 
the same targets to attack. It is likely that such groups do not have access to zero-day 
vulnerabilities since they would be too valuable to reveal without any financial gain. It is likely 
that they rely on installations that have not yet applied the patches needed. 
3.2.4 Vulnerability Black Market 
The vulnerability black market is not a regulated market and it is not controlled by any laws. 
This market allows any groups or organizations such as cyber criminals, terrorists, or 
government agencies to buy vulnerabilities. The price paid to the vulnerability discoverers is said 
to be five to ten times the amount of the other vulnerability markets, depending on the attributes 
of the vulnerabilities [31, 41]. The estimated price range given by some in-the-field experts for a 
zero-day exploit is given in (Table 3.2) [46, 48]. Many governmental and commercial 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, Intel, the Indian Defense Ministry, and 
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, have suffered from the malicious attacks [61]. 
Government agencies in several countries have programs to develop new cyber weapons, and 
they may be significant players in the black market for zero-day vulnerabilities [65]. 




3.3 The Consumers (Buyers) of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
Ultimately, the buyers of vulnerability information are either software developers who 
intend to eliminate the vulnerability by developing a patch, or an organization that intends to use 
it for purposes that would seem malicious to its opponents. When a government agency is a 
buyer, it can bring a substantial amount to money to the market that other buyers may be unable 
to match. This may raise the prices of the vulnerabilities and in turn encourage more experts to 
enter the profession of vulnerability discovery. The motivations of consumers differ depending 
on the type of consumer, but we can divide those motivations into two categories: patching the 
vulnerability or attacking others. 
3.4 Potential Impact of Money Flow 
In the past few years, several government agencies associated with different countries have 
started investing in offensive and defensive capabilities for engaging in cyber warfare and 
espionage [46]. In comparison with conventional military hardware, the cyber capabilities are 
potentially much more cost-effective. Reports suggest that some vulnerabilities, along with their 
exploits, can bring a significant amount of money. This could cause a significant shift in the 
markets. As we discuss, it might lead software developers to be more aggressive in their reward 
programs. 
3.5 Vulnerability Markets and the Risks to Society 
A few researchers have recently evaluated security risk based on the vulnerability life-cycle 
[66]. However, they have not considered the impact of the vulnerability markets. Figure 3.2 
shows the vulnerability flow involving the markets.  
As Figure 3.2 shows, even disclosed vulnerabilities can be a source of risk. Some 
vulnerabilities can be disclosed without a patch either because of logistics reasons or because 
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they are judged to be inconsequential (state ewp Disclosure without Patch). When the patch is 
available, some users may not apply it, immediately leaving it in an exposed state (state epn Patch 
not Applied). Some of the conventional vulnerability scanning products offer protection against 
such states.  
 
Figure 3.2: Vulnerability flow through markets to zero-day exploitation or patching 
There is no protection against zero-day vulnerabilities, however, which have not been 
publically disclosed (state ek Keep until Ready). We can note that the captive market has two 
options: sell the vulnerability to software developers or keep it until it can be used for an attack, 
for example. Even highly secured systems can be potentially exploited using the zero-day. They 
can be expensive to acquire, but can be used for cyber warfare, cyber terrorism, espionage, or an 
attack on vital institutions of an opposing nation. 
Figure 3.2 shows the three states ek, ewp, epn, in which the vulnerability is exposed. The risk 
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Where i is one of the one of the exposed states (ek, ewp, epn) and λi is the transition rate from 
that state to the exploitation state. P(ei) is the probability of being in the state ei.  
Note that a zero-day attack is only possible for a vulnerability passing through the 
unregulated markets, with the exception of a captive market (such as a defense lab) where the 
objective is to discover vulnerabilities for exploitation. 
A significant fraction of the cyber-attacks on systems belonging to individuals or 
organizations occur though ewp, epn. An attack through ewp is through a known risk, and one 
through epn could be considered a consequence of negligence. However, an attack through ek 
would be completely unexpected, and, depending on the target and the type of breach, can have 
devastating consequences on an organization or a society. 
As we observe, a large fraction of successful vulnerability discoverers is from regions that 
are not as industrially developed. Some of these regions are also known for their sophisticated 
vulnerability exploiters [67]. This suggests that economics might play a significant role in 
potential approaches for keeping the society safe. 
An attractive reward program based on vulnerability criticality can provide a significant 
alternative to the gray and the black markets. A few software developers and security 
organizations now run a small number of such programs. These programs ensure time for patch 
development before a disclosure. Some of the top discoverers that we contacted suggest that 
sometimes the reward programs do not pay enough, and a better reward may be obtained on the 
black market (although none of them admitted to selling any vulnerabilities in such a market.) 
We note that after a few years of very successful vulnerability discovery, many of the top 
discoverers apparently disappear from the scene as credited discoverers. Some of them suggest 
(3.1)
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that they find it more profitable to contract out their security auditing services to software 
developers. This can also significantly reduce the risk to the society. 
Companies and organizations need to design attractive vulnerability reward programs for 
their products. This will allow the legitimate markets to compete with the black market.  
Some reward programs, such as the one for Google Chrome, appear to have been successful. 
While the amount of money committed to the reward programs is only a tiny part of the 
company’s revenues, Google is giving out some of the best monetary rewards. 
A significant part of the global vulnerabilities market is quite opaque. Even the emerging 
legitimate markets have not been studied in detail, although some mathematical studies based on 
the classical market theories have appeared. There is a need to examine actual data and practices 
in order to understand the vulnerability discovery and disclosure. 
The zero-day vulnerabilities with exploits are a serious issue. The number of high-profile 
attacks that use the zero-day has increased sharply during the first three months of 2013 [68], 
demonstrating the amount of risk associated with the unregulated markets [36]. Mechanisms 
need to be developed to make it more profitable for researchers to sell their discovered 















Vulnerability discovery models that attempt to model the vulnerability discovery process 
have been recently proposed [69, 70]. However, there has not been a study of actual vulnerability 
discoverers and what motivates them. The individuals who discover the vulnerabilities (termed 
discoverers here) and those who exploit them (exploiters) are two separate groups.  Discovering 
a vulnerability takes a much higher degree of technical skill and insight.  The exploiters do not 
require a comparable skill—in fact, in the presence of an exploit (code that exploits one or more 
vulnerabilities), a patient hacker may achieve a security breach largely mechanically.  The 
vulnerability discoverers represent a critical source of risk, should they choose to sell the 
vulnerability to malicious organizations or individuals. For example, Google has twice paid a 
$60,000 reward for details on a single vulnerability [39], suggesting that the potential damage 
caused by these vulnerabilities could have been enormous.  
Many vulnerability discoverers seek to preserve the right to their claim of having discovered 
a vulnerability, since it serves to acknowledge the discoverer’s expertise.  For example, the well-
known University of Cambridge researcher Ross Anderson mentions a vulnerability he and his 
student discovered in 2003 [71].  A mid-year peak in vulnerability discovery, specifically in 
Microsoft products, can be explained by the coinciding date of a major conference, wherein 
security experts often present their vulnerability findings [72].  
As presented in this study, a large percentage of vulnerabilities are found by experts external 
to the actual software development organizations.  They are free to disclose the vulnerabilities 
they discover in any way they like.  The hackers who are vulnerability exploiters are often 
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classified as white hat, black hat, and gray hat [42, 43]. These classifications do not apply to the 
security researchers engaged in finding vulnerabilities. However, the vulnerability markets may 
be classified as legitimate, where the transactions are properly recorded and disclosed; black, 
where the transactions are not disclosed; or gray, where the transactions are at the borderline.  
The current software vulnerability reward programs are a major part of the legitimate markets 
that attempt to attract the vulnerability discoverers who might otherwise resort to selling their 
findings on the black market. Those programs are relatively new and sometimes limited. They 
attempt to bring a discovery to the legitimate market, which significantly reduces the risk to the 
society.  It is possible that some groups, such as government defense agencies, may be willing to 
pay a much higher price in the black or gray market [4].  
Any unpatched vulnerabilities in a software program can allow hackers to attack the system, 
harming an organization or compromising sensitive information.  Therefore, remedying any 
newly discovered vulnerabilities before they are exploited is critical.  While many discoverers 
are likely to be responsible professionals, they need to be provided the opportunity to use their 
skills in a positive, productive way in order to avoid passing the information to those who might 
exploit the vulnerabilities. If there is a lack of incentives from organizations in the field, they 
might be tempted to sell the information in the vulnerability black market, resulting in possible 
exploitation of systems. 
The motivation for vulnerability discoverers has been considered briefly by researchers in 
the past [73], but has never been studied using actual data. The discovery and disclosure of 
vulnerabilities are processes that are significantly impacted by the economics involved [74]. A 
few researchers have considered theoretical modeling of the vulnerabilities market. This paper 
asks these questions: who are the actual vulnerability finders, and what motivates them? 
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Vulnerability discovery is done by either researchers affiliated with a major organization 
(and who generally follow proper disclosure policies) or by freelance researchers, who may sell 
their findings, either in the legitimate or in the gray or black markets. 
We study the current types of vulnerability discoverers. We find initially in Figure 4.1 that 
vulnerability discovery is done by either researchers affiliated with a major organization (and 
who generally follow proper disclosure policies) or by freelance researchers, who may sell their 
findings, either in the legitimate or in the gray or black markets. Some vulnerabilities are sold in 
the legitimate market via vulnerability reward programs, or by contacting venders directly.  The 
developers get a chance to develop software patches for the vulnerabilities before the 
vulnerability is disclosed. On the other hand, when the vulnerabilities are sold on the black 
market, they are likely to be exploited before public disclosure.  The key strategy would be to 
encourage the researchers to sell their discovered vulnerabilities in the legitimate market instead 
of the black market (dotted circle on the figure). This will reduce trading in the black market and 
more vulnerabilities will enter the legitimate market. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The events in the vulnerability lifecycle 
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However, we also investigate who the actual vulnerability finders are and what motivates 
them. To answer these questions, we use several steps. The following subsections describe those 
steps in detail. 
4.2 Top Discoverers 
To understand the vulnerability discovery process, we examine the records of the top 
vulnerability discoverers. Since each of them has successfully discovered a significant number of 
vulnerabilities, we can presume that they did not just get lucky—rather, they have a system that 
has been demonstrated to work. To find the top vulnerability discoverers, we obtained data from 
the OSVDB database (until May 2013). We identified the top fifteen vulnerability discoverers in 
the database who found the most vulnerabilities, as given in (Table 4.1). The actual names are 
not identifiable in some cases; they are generally known by the login identifier that they use in 
their blogs. Table 4.1 includes some of information about them obtained from blogs and 
discussion boards in addition to OSVDB. (Table 4.1) illustrates the global distribution of 
vulnerability finders. A significant number of them are in eastern and western Europe, with a few 
in the Far East, in addition to some in the United States. This shows why the legal framework 
within a single country cannot regulate the vulnerability markets. Thus, while ideal vulnerability 
markets can be proposed, they cannot be implemented. Ultimately, economics will govern the 
markets.  
Table 4.1: The top vulnerabilities discoverers on OSVDB 
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However, Figure 4.2 gives a plot of the yearly discoveries of all of the top discoverers (line 
marked with a diamond). Year 1 corresponds to the first year of the discovery. Most of the top 
discoverers here are credited with discovering the vulnerabilities during the first three years (line 
marked with a rectangle). However, a few discoverers have continued to discover vulnerabilities 
for several years. This raises an intriguing question. Why do some very successful discoverers 
disappear from the scene after two to three years? A possible explanation is that, during those 
two to three years, they acquire the notoriety of being accomplished vulnerability discoverers. 
After that, they start offering their services to software developers or security service companies 
on a contract basis or as employees. Some of them may be able to start their own small 
organizations. In both cases, they are able to obtain steady and significant remuneration rather 
than a few rewards from the reward programs. This is supported by the information that some of 
them have provided us, as discussed below. 
 






4.3 Outsider and Insider Discoverers 
One key question in understanding the vulnerability discovery process is whether a 
discoverer of vulnerabilities is a part of the software product team or an outsider. This will help 
us to understand what motivates discoverers to find and report software vulnerabilities. To 
address this question we examined two well-known open-source software products (as example): 
Safari and Google Chromium (Table 4.2, Figures 4.3, 4.4). The period we investigated was from 
July 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012, and we used the Open Source Vulnerability Database 














Figure 4.3: Vulnerability discoverers in Safari 
Figure 4.4: Vulnerability discoverers in Chromium 
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As shown in Table 4.2, for these two products, the majority of the vulnerabilities discovered 
were found by outsiders.  Finifter et al. [17] have also found this to be true for particularly for 
Google Chrome although not for Firefox. This demonstrates the importance of outsider 
discoverers and the potential significance of providing discoverers with more enticing 
vulnerability reward programs, or other forms of a legitimate market. It is definitely worth 
knowing what would motivate the discoverers to participate in such reward programs.  




4.4 Direct Information 
Some of the vulnerability markets are secretive, specifically the gray market, where the 
brokers serve as intermediaries, and the black market. They are, however, believed to be of great 
significance, and government agencies are emerging as vulnerability buyers. To understand the 
motivations and mechanics of different markets, we decided to directly contact the top 
discoverers of OSVDB to seek information. We were able to locate contact information for many 
of them. We then contacted them and asked some key questions, including the following: 
1) What motivates you to discover software vulnerability? 
2) How and when did you start? 
3) What specific tools do you use for discovering vulnerability? 
4) Did you stop working as a vulnerability discoverer? If so, when and why did that happen? 
If not, why not? 
5) Do you think that vulnerability reward programs will help reduce black market transactions 
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and encourage the use of legitimate markets? Please explain. 
6) Did you apply to one of the current vulnerability reward programs, and if so, why? 
7) If you have discovered a vulnerability, when would you consider selling your vulnerability 
to a broker? Please explain. 
8) In your view, are there any specific steps that software developers or government agencies 
can do to reduce the security risk to society? Please explain.  
9) Do you have any other comments? 
Considering that freelance vulnerability discoverers can sometimes be secretive, we were 
pleasantly surprised when several of them actually responded; although most of them did not 
reply to us. The following section includes some of the answers to the above questions. To 
ensure their privacy, we have replaced the discoverers’ names with aliases. Table 4.3 
summarizes the responses.  
• Discoverer 1: He uses his own tools, “specifically [his] hands and mind, in preference to 
automated tools”. He has not sold a vulnerability in the past ten years. He does not find the 
reward program to be attractive. He never sold his own discovered vulnerability to brokers or 
any buyers, but he has sent vulnerabilities directly to the software venders.  
• Discoverer 2: The main reason he became a vulnerability discoverer was that he wanted 
to promote his own website and his source code review service. He only uses his own tools, 
which are offered on his organization’s website. He states that that vulnerability reward 
programs are of limited use, as the black markets offer more money. Like Discoverer 1, he does 
not apply for any reward programs. 
• Discoverer 3: He started in 2002 while following Bugtraq and other mailing lists. He uses 
both public and proprietary tools to discover vulnerabilities. Although he now runs his own 
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company, he still finds the time for discovery work. He states that reward programs pay very 
little for exclusive information and bug patches, which can be sold for much more on the black 
market. Nevertheless, he has submitted some vulnerabilities to the ZDI and iDefense reward 
programs in the past.  
• Discoverer 4: He started in 2008 and focuses entirely on web application security flaws, 
largely specific to free and open source applications. To discover vulnerabilities, he uses a 
combination of tools such as Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, and a number of Firefox plugins 
(Tamper Data), as well as simple manual testing. He thinks that, for the most part, vulnerability 
reward programs will help to reduce black markets and encourage legitimate markets. He 
acknowledges that money is always a motivator and if vulnerability discoverers are paid well via 
the legitimate market, hopefully they will be less likely to sell the bug on the black market. He 
claims that he does not sell vulnerabilities. He always coordinates his findings with Secunia but 
does not take any further action regarding the vulnerability. 
• Discoverer 5: He believes that the most profitable option for a vulnerability discoverer is 
to offer software security auditing services. His first discoveries were done between 1992 and 
1993. The tools that he uses for discovering vulnerabilities are Notepad++ for PHP and other 
scripting languages, which allow him to search specific text strings through multiple files and 
color-coding. He also uses Apache/PHP/MySQL on his home PC, and all of his web application 
research is done using @localhost. Discoverer 5 usually works manually, without automatic 
vulnerability scanners. He believes that vulnerability reward programs will surely lessen damage, 
and is aware of hundreds of zero-day findings sold to ZDI and other vulnerability reward 
programs. He has worked with ZDI and iDefense because they pay for findings, arrange all 
communications with developers, and give him credit in the public advisory.  
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• Discoverer 6: He began to delve further into discovering after he did an interesting 
exercise during a computer security lab when he was a university student. He uses popular open-
source tools, such as the ones distributed with Kali Linux, as well as his own scripts. He is still 
working in vulnerability discovering as a web application security pentester. He thinks that 
vulnerability rewards programs should be lucrative since pentesting requires a great deal of time, 
which results in a personal output of money and effort. Therefore, if one cannot earn money 
through legitimate channels, he will sell his discovered vulnerabilities on the black market. He is 
an active participant in all major bug bounty programs for two reasons: money and renown in the 
community. However, he claims that he himself has never considered selling the bugs he 
discovers to a broker. 
• Discoverer 7: He began doing so in his early teens by finding security issues in the online 
games that he played. He used various intercepting proxy/tools for replaying requests, such as 
LiveHTTPHeaders or Burp Proxy, for vulnerability discovering. He is still involved in 
vulnerability discovering as a full-time employee on the Product Security team at Facebook. He 
has submitted issues to many of the bug bounty programs that currently exist; he believes that 
these programs are a great way to apply his skills and have his efforts rewarded and recognized. 
As a responsible vulnerability discoverer, he always tries to disclose an issue to the vendor 
before selling the vulnerability to a broker. 
• Discoverer 8: He used HttpWatch and Burp Suite to capture the http traffic and did the 
rest of the work manually. He has taken a break from discovering vulnerabilities since he did not 
get enough time. He thinks that legal rewards programs offer white-hats good money, so there 
are fewer chances that white-hats will become black-hats. He has been participating in rewards 
programs for the past year and a half. He only reports vulnerabilities to vendors, and claims that 
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he never thinks about selling vulnerabilities to brokers or anyone else. If a vendor does not 
respond properly, he discloses the vulnerability in a blog post, but he does not sell it. He believes 
that government agencies should support and encourage new rewards programs, such as 
HackerOne (a bug bounty program for the internet).  
Table 4.3: Top vulnerability discoverers’ answers to specific questions about their vulnerability 
discovering and reward programs 
 
 
We note that many of the discoverers acknowledge the significance of the gray market and 
the black market in vulnerabilities. Many of them have found it profitable to engage in contract 
work after having established credentials as expert vulnerability finders. 
Another notable observation from this study is the fact that the freelance discoverers appear 
to rely on their expertise more than on specific tools. Some of them have developed their own 
tools based on their experience. This suggests that the discovery of previously unknown 
vulnerabilities is a research activity requiring considerable technical skill, rather than something 
that can be completely automated using algorithmic methods. This should be contrasted with 
vulnerability scanning tools that look for known, i.e. already disclosed, vulnerabilities. 
4.5 Discussion 
Upon investigating the factors that influence vulnerability discovery and disclosure, we 
summarize our findings as follows. 
We note that freelance discoverers play a significant role in vulnerability discovery. In some 
cases, they have even formed their own companies or groups. An unusually high number of 
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successful vulnerability discoverers are from Eastern Europe, a region also known for its 
sophisticated vulnerability exploiters [67]. That may be attributable to a high degree of technical 
skill combined with weaker local economies. The rewards for finding vulnerabilities often come 
from international software organizations based in the United States.   
Discovering vulnerabilities requires considerable technical and research skills. Some of the 
discoverers have an extensive background in software security. The responses by the top 
discoverers to our questions suggest that they tend to rely on their expertise and intuition rather 
than just the tools. The discoverers, like other well paid software professionals or researchers, 
expect to be fairly compensated for their services. With a few critical, high-severity 
vulnerabilities in hand, they may be in a position to bargain. 
An attractive reward program based on vulnerability criticality can provide a significant 
alternative to the black market. A few software developers and security organizations now run a 
small number of such programs.  These programs ensure time for patch development before a 
disclosure. Some of the top discoverers that we contacted suggest that sometimes the reward 
programs do not pay enough, and a better reward may be obtained on the black market, but none 
of them admitted to selling any vulnerabilities on the black market. 
We note that after a few years of very successful vulnerability discovery, many of the top 
discoverers apparently disappear from the scene as credited discoverers.  Some of them suggest 
that they find it more profitable to contract out their security auditing services to software 
developers.  
The black market may often provide better rewards for some individual vulnerabilities than 
current legitimate programs.  The black market might sometimes be more attractive because 
applying to reward programs may be tedious or slow. Limited awareness of reward programs 
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may also contribute to the attractiveness of the black markets. The reports suggest that many of 
the buyers in the black market may be affiliated with various governments [46], bringing a 
significant amount of money to the black market. 
Companies and organizations need to design attractive vulnerability reward programs for 
their products. This will allow the legitimate markets to compete with the black market. Some 
reward programs, such as the one for Google Chrome, appear to have been successful. Google 
has a good reputation in technology as well as management, and has recognized the discoverers 
as high-achievement professionals. While the amount of money committed to the reward 
programs is only a tiny part of the company’s revenues, Google is giving out some of the best 
monetary rewards. 
A significant part of the global vulnerabilities market is quite opaque. Even the emerging 
legitimate markets have not been studied in detail, although some mathematical studies based on 
the classical market theories have appeared. There is a need to examine actual data and practices 
in order to understand the vulnerability discovery and disclosure. 
4.6 Study Limitations 
There is not yet enough data to start development of key hypotheses regarding the 
mechanics of multiple vulnerability markets. Considering the nature of the field, it will not be 
possible in the near future to obtain representative samples. Here, we explore some potential 
limitations of this research due to the size of the sample and its potential bias. 
Sample Size: We tried to analyze the OSVDB dataset to find the top discoverers there 
because other databases do not include the names of discoverers. Unfortunately, the OSVDB 
database is not available for direct analysis. We relied on some manual analysis in addition to 
their reports to identify a larger number of top discoverers. We thus left out the discoverers who 
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have discovered only a small number of vulnerabilities. We attempted to locate the email 
addresses of the top discoverers on OSVDB and sent emails to the individuals. We were happy 
to note that several of the discoverers were willing to share information with us. It is unlikely 
that a significantly larger sample of top discoverers would be willing to participate in a study. 
We have also contacted some of the discoverers who have been active in several vulnerability 
rewards programs. Only three of them have responded so far.  
Sample Bias: It is likely that those who responded to the questions were much more likely to 
be on the “white hat” side of the business. However, some of the respondents candidly 
acknowledged the lure of the black market, although none of them actually directly 
acknowledged having been a part of it. Innovative methods need to be developed that would 




Chapter 5  





Estimates of the costs incurred in such data breaches are published frequently. However, 
those estimates vary widely. Without proper disclosure by the impacted organizations, it is hard to 
compare the risk of information loss and its potential costs. Thus, the collection and aggregation 
of such information is vital. A careful quantitative analysis of data from the disclosures can be 
used to allocate resources for prevention and recovery after a breach. However, there is no 
established approach, although a few organizations such as the Ponemon Institute and 
NetDiligence are involved in data collection. This makes empirical cost estimation challenging. 
To assist in prioritizing potential actions and obtain more information on the nature of data 
breaches, the assessment of immediate and long-term costs, and the development of effective 
countermeasures, detailed studies are needed. 
Data breaches impact a large fraction of all organizations. For instance, 43% of companies in 
the United States experienced a data breach in 2013 [75]. In 2015, there were 781 data breaches 
that were reported in U.S. companies (including small businesses), and according to the Identity 
Theft Resource Center [76], more than 169 million records were exposed. The cost of data 
breaches has increased 23% since 2013 according to studies conducted by IBM and the Ponemon 
institute [77].  
According to the Ponemon Institute’s studies of U.S. data breaches, the average cost of a 
compromised record has not changed significantly over the last five years. However, according to 
the NetDiligence studies, the average cost per record steadily increased between 2012 and 2015 
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(Figure 5.1) because the median number of records exposed was very small. The average data 
breach cost has also been increasing over the last three years (2013, 2014, and 2015) for most 
countries included in the Global Analysis study of the Ponemon Institute (Figure 5.2). For 
Germany and Australia, the average cost per record has varied slightly or remained almost the 
same. Some data costs of Canada and the Arabian Cluster (including Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates) are not available for some of the years.  
 




Figure 5.2: Average cost per compermised record of data breaches in 11 countries over the last 
three years according to Ponemon 
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A systematic study of data breach costs can help optimize data breach response plans, and 
this can potentially lead to a reduction in the costs related to breaches of up to 47% according to a 
Symantec/Ponemon Institute study [78]. 
The objective of this study is to examine, compare, and evaluate the existing approaches for 
assessing data breach costs and identifying the issues that need to be addressed. This is a major 
challenge that requires significant effort for the methods to have good predictive capability, as can 
be seen from the following sections. Some organizations have developed online cost calculators 
based on their collection of data and modeling assumptions. Unfortunately, the computations 
incorporated in the calculators are proprietary. Since these tools represent a significant effort by 
individuals with access to detailed data, we begin by examining these data breach cost calculators. 
The calculators have been implemented independently and vary considerably in their approaches. 
The results obtained by these calculators can be different by as much as two orders of magnitude. 
We attempt to extract the trends and logical assumptions used in the model and identify the 
questions that need to be resolved to obtain a consolidated approach that can be explained and 
calibrated using available data. 
Utilizing an exhaustive range and combinations of inputs, we examine how each calculator 
computes the cost of data breaches for difference scenarios. We identify the factors that affect the 
costs of data breaches used in the various calculators and then classify those factors into logically 
related categories. We then attempt to identify the factors that are correlated in the same category 
to remove redundancy among factors. Further simplification is possible by identifying factors that 
have a significant impact in these calculators as well as ones that have little or no impact. We then 
model an approach needed to construct complete systemic models for data breach costs based on 
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the calculators and actual data regarding data breach costs. We validate components of the model 
using data from some recent well-documented breaches.  
5.2 Background 
This section presents background information necessary to discussing data breaches and their 
impact.   
5.2.1 Types of Data Breaches 
Data breaches have significant impacts on the economics and finances of individuals, 
organizations, and in some cases may even impact segments of the economies in various 
countries. There are several classes of data breaches, such as misuse of systems by employees or 
partners, intrusions with no theft of data, intrusions leading to the theft of personal data such as 
credit card numbers or social security numbers, and intrusions leading to the theft of intellectual 
property or confidential correspondence/documents.  
5.2.2 Causes of Data Breaches 
There are several possible causes of data breaches. These include exploiting weak or stolen 
login credentials, malware, presence of vulnerabilities or accessible back doors, and social 
engineering. 
5.2.3 Economic Costs (impact) of Data Breaches 
The cybercrimes that occur following data breaches and the impact of these crimes on the 
economy in terms of damage and cost can be enormous. In many cases, the damages to individual 
organizations have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Some costs are not 
easily measurable, such as impact on segments of the economy or national security. 
5.2.4 Main Cyber Insurers 
Several insurance companies cover parts of the costs due to security breaches. For some of 
the breaches, a significant fraction of the costs was covered by insurance. The data collected by 
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NetDiligence, which was used for the Hub International Calculator, was based on insurance 
claims. 
5.2.5 Databases of Data Breaches 
There are several databases that provide information about security data breaches and help 
researchers analyze and contribute their results to reduce the impacts that result from data 
breaches. The main databases include Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) [79], DATALOSSdb 
[80], the Veris Community Database (VCDB) [81], and Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID) 
[82]. While the information in these databases was not directly applicable to this phase of the 
study, they can be valuable for validation of results once a computational model, based on the 
observations here, has been constructed. 
5.3 Approach 
To study the existing approaches for calculating the cost of data security, we identified and 
examined the existing data breach cost calculators that are available online. While there exist 
some reports on the overall observations of the data that some of the calculators are based on, 
details of the approaches taken by the calculators are not available. These calculators are intended 
for estimating the costs of data breaches. They require values of several factors as inputs. Here we 
examined the factors impacting the calculations and attempt to classify the factors into those 
impacting breach costs and those impacting the probability of breaches. Then, we developed a 
methodology for obtaining the breach costs (in most cases, the cost is per record) for several 
values of each factor. In some cases, we examined several combinations of factors that could have 
a mutual impact. Some calculators only generate the cost while others also generate the 
probability of a breach of the type examined.  
After collecting the necessary data, we systematically identified the factors that appeared to 
be somewhat redundant. The redundant factors were merged. We also identified the factors that 
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emerged as significant and removed the insignificant factors. Some calculators apparently do not 
use any built-in data and require users to input all the parameters needed for computations. In 
addition, some of the calculators did not provide any breakdown of the overall costs and thus were 
not useful at this time.  
We noted that using different calculators can result in very different estimates. To evaluate 
the calculators, we examined two major cases involving massive data breaches in large 
companies.  
5.4 Analysis of Calculators 
Here we examine the existing online data breach cost calculators and the factors they use. We 
use a large number of different input combinations to estimate how the calculators (in some cases: 
some calculators) compute both the cost and probability of a specific data breach.  
5.4.1 Basic Information on Data Breach Cost Calculators 
Various calculators for estimating data breach costs are available online for educational, 
illustrative, or other purposes. The calculators examined include Hub 
International/NetDiligence[83], Symantec/Ponemon Institute [84], MegaPath/Ponemon [85], 
Identity Theft (IDT911) [86], CyberTab [87], and IBM/Ponemon [88] (Table 5.1). Note that three 
of the calculators were implemented in conjunction with the Ponemon Institute, although they 
were released at different times. It is likely that they were implemented using the data collected 
immediately prior to the implementation of the calculator. Only two of the calculators compute 
the probability of the exploit of the type examined. 
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Table 5.1: data breach cost calculators examined 
 
 
5.4.1.1 Hub International and NetDiligence Calculator 
Hub International provides risk services, insurance brokers, and consultants. Since it was 
formed through the merger of 11 Canadian insurance brokerages in 1998, it has been a global 
insurance broker. Hub International launched its calculator (eRisk portal) on July 18, 2012 [89] to 
assist and protect information businesses against cyber loss. The calculator is powered by the data 
collected for a NetDiligence study that was apparently done in 2011 [90]. The calculator generates 
four partial costs as well as the total cost and the cost per record. 
5.4.1.2 Symantec and Ponemon Institute Calculator 
This calculator is presented through the cooperation of Symantec (as sponsor) and the 
Ponemon Institute (as the organization behind the data source). The calculator was launched in 
2010 based on archive.org archives, and its most recent version appears to be based on the data 
included in “2011 Cost of Data Breach Cost Study: United States” [91]. This study was based on 
the actual data breach experiences of 49 U.S. companies in 14 different industry sectors, including 
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data collected from 400 interviewed individuals and 268 organizations. It takes into account a 
wide range of direct and indirect business costs. The Ponemon Institute has been collecting 
similar data since 2005 and has published annual reports based on that data.  
5.4.1.3 MegaPath and Ponemon Institute Calculator 
MegaPath Corporation is a provider of secure access solutions. It launched its data breach 
risk calculator on November 19, 2013 [92]. The calculator was developed by Ponemon Institute 
experts and is apparently based on the 2012 study, “Data Security in Small Healthcare 
Organizations” [92] based on the numbers used.  
5.4.1.4 IDentity Theft (IDT911) Calculator 
IDT911 is a Canadian insurer of major credit unions and banks. It was established in 2003 
[93] and focuses on providing services related to identity protection, identity theft recovery, and 
data risk management. Based on archive.org archives, it appears to have launched its calculator in 
2014. The calculator is based on three sources of information: proprietary data collected from 
IDT911’s experiences handling data breaches; information available to the public through many 
public, private, and non-profit groups and sources; and information collected from the users of a 
website that tracks breach statistics. 
5.4.1.5 CyberTab Calculator 
CyberTab is a tool intended for information security and other senior executives for assessing 
the potential damage to their organizations from electronic attacks. It was released in 2014 [94]. 
Its calculator was developed by The Economist Intelligence Unit and sponsored by the well-
known consulting organization Booz Allen Hamilton.  
5.4.1.6 IBM and Ponemon Institute Calculator 
The IBM Calculator is sponsored by IBM and based on data used in the study “2015 Cost of 
Data Breach Study: Global Analysis [77]”. This study is the tenth annual survey conducted by the 
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Ponemon Institute, and it includes data from 250 organizations across 12 countries: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, UK, USA, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The 
calculator appears to have been launched in 2014. 
5.4.2 Factors used as determinants of Data Breach Costs 
After analyzing the factors used to estimate the costs of data breaches in the data breach 
calculators, we divided the main factors into two main groups—those affecting the data breach 
costs and those affecting the likelihood of a breach—based on our logic and judgment. Most 
calculators calculate only data breach costs, but a few estimate the likelihood of breaches as well. 
Table 5.2 shows some of the factors that are common among calculators. The Cost group includes 
the following subgroups/factors: the number of affected records, the breach type/business type, 
business size indicators, data location, credit monitoring years, and a group of four binary 
(Yes/No) factors. The second group includes the main factors affecting the probability of a data 
breach. They include: organizational attributes (technical, commitment to security, policies), 
industry classification, and history of data breaches. Table 5.2 clearly demonstrates that there is 
considerable divergence among the calculators, which may be based on the different perspectives 
used by the calculator developers. 
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Table 5.2: Comparable factors in data breach cost calculators 
 
5.4.3 Analyzing the Data Breach Cost Calculators 
Careful and thorough exercising of the available data breach cost calculators is critical for 
modeling their functionality in terms of the factors they consider. We carefully compiled the 
outputs generated using a large number of strategically used input combinations. We summarize 
our observations as follows. 
different times. It is likely that they were implemented using 1) Hub International and NetDiligence Calculator 
TABLE II.  COMPARABLE FACTORS IN DATA BREACH COST CALCULATORS 




























































































































Total number of affected records X X X X X X 
Type of data 
breached 
/business Type  
Types of information do employees handle X X X X X X 
Business size  
 
Global headcount of organization (size)  X X  X X 
Global footprint of organization (branches)  X  X  X 
Organization’s headquarters or where does it conduct the majority 
of its business  
 X   X X 




Number of years of credit monitoring X      
Some binary 
factors 
Actual fraud has occurred  X      
PCI compliance has an issue X      
Federal class action lawsuit has been filed X      






















Employees, partners, or other can access sensitive information, 
networks or applications from a local or remote location 
 X  X   
Organization’s practices concerning the transfer of sensitive 
personal information to other organizations 
  X    
Percentage of company’s IT operations are conducted in public or 
semi-public cloud environments 
  X    
Commitments 
to security 
Sensitive data encrypted on all laptops or removable storage during 
transmission, storage, or retrieval of data 
 X  X  X 
Organization has a dedicated information security leader, such as a 
chief information security officer (CISO) 
 X    X 
Strong authentication measures have been deployed to protect 
sensitive networks and applications from unauthorized access 
 X     
Organization has a data breach incident response plan in place 
today by its business continuity management (BCM) team 
  X   X 
Organization’s leaders and/or business owners consider information 
security and data protection a priority 
  X    
Organization’s security budget adequate for preventing material 
data breach incidents 
  X    
How	long	does	the	business	retain	sensitive	information	
pertaining	to	employees,	customers,	and	patients? 
   X   
Policies Privacy and data protection security policy  X    X 
Industry 
classification  
Organization’s industry classification  X X X X X 
History 
Organization experienced a material data breach within the past 12 
to 24 months  
  X   X 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach caused by a third 
party's negligence or criminal acts? 
     X 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach caused by the loss 
or theft of a laptop, smart phone, tablet, USB thumb drive, or other 
portable data bearing devices? 
     X 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach incident that was 
publicly disclosed to the media, advocates, and/OR regulators?  
     X 
External  Likely cause of a data breach  X   X X 
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5.4.3.1 Hub International and NetDiligence Calculator 
The Hub International Calculator uses seven factors and computes the four partial costs for 
the two types of data breaches (records): (1) Personal Health information (PHI) and Social 
Security Number (SSN), and (2) credit cards (CC). The partial costs are influenced by the 
following binary factors:  
a) Whether the data is centralized store,  
b)Whether actual fraud (actual fraud means the data has been stolen and used 
already before) has occurred,  
c)Whether there has been a Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance issue, 
and  
d) Whether a federal class action lawsuit has been filed.  
The overall cost is divided into four partial costs: i) costs associated with incident 
investigation, ii) customer notification and crisis management, iii) regulatory and industry 
sanctions, and iv) class action lawsuits. Not all factors directly impact all the partial costs. 
Therefore, we have analyzed each partial cost individually. For the analysis, we examined all 16 
binary cases (since there are 4 different binary factors). Each case is represented using 4 bits, 
starting from 0000 to 1111, where each bit represents each binary factor as Yes/No. We used 
sample sizes from 1000 to 100 million for the number of records compromised. The sizes of 
affected records were incremented by a multiplication factor of 10 (1000, 10000, up to 
100,000,000). Then, we collected the partial cost values generated for each size for each binary 
case. We repeated the analysis for each of the two types of data breaches with one year of credit 
monitoring, which is generally offered to affected customers.  
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Figure 5.3: Partial costs from Hub International calculator for credit cards for the binary case: 
0000 (all four factors a, b, c, d are false) 
 
We obtained the relationship of each partial cost with the number of records from each 
binary case using the trendline of each chart. An example is shown in Figure 5.3. Generally, 
power regression provided the good fit. Next we analyzed for all power equations (y= ax^b) for 
each partial cost for all binary cases. We made two main observations, as discussed below.    
Table 5.3: Parameters a and b for each partial costs of credit cards type in Hub International 




Table 5.4: Parameters a and b for each partial costs of PHI and SSN types in Hub International 
depending on the binary factor 
 
First, as shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we can observe the impacted factors for each partial 
cost in Hub International. For instance, the incident investigation costs are impacted by the factors 
of centralized data, actual fraud, and action lawsuit. The column marked Yes indicates the 
numbers when the factor applies. The cost of incident investigation will be high in cases of non-
centralized data, actual fraud, or the filing of a federal class action lawsuit since the costs of 
forensic investigation, security remediation, legal defense, litigation, and damages are high. In 
addition, customer notification/crisis management costs are impacted by only one factor: the 
number of years of credit monitoring for each victim. Usually, the average length of credit 
monitoring is one year. The third cost, regulatory and industry sanctions, is affected by one factor, 
which is the existence of issues related to PCI compliance. This cost will be high in cases of PCI 
compliance issues for large numbers of affected records. The last cost, the cost of a class action 
lawsuit, is impacted by two factors: the occurrence of actual fraud and the filing of a federal class 
action lawsuit. If the two factors are applied, costs will be high since eDiscovery litigation, legal 
defense, and damages are also high. In addition, we collect both costs of a and b for each 
impacted factor in each partial cost when the factor has impacted the partial cost or not. 
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INTERNATIONAL CALCULATOR IN POWER EQUATION y=ax^b 
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1 (xxxx) 1 (xxxx) 
Observations Constant regardless of 
the other factors.  








Lawsuit 	 x1x1  





00x1 + x011  
x1x1  
Observations	 Actual	 fraud	 has	 some	
impact,	 but	 lawsuit	
factor	 has	 the	 main	
impact	 on	 the	 lawsuit	
cost.	 
Actual	 fraud	 has	 some	
impact,	but	lawsuit	factor	




Table 5.6: Impact of binary factors for PHI and SSN in Hub International calculator in power 
equation y=ax^b 
 
Second, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate two important facts: which factor has significant 
impact on the partial cost and what is the initial status of the factor (i.e., if the factor impacts a or 
b). However, we examine how a and b work in the power equation y = ax^b, where x is the 
number of affected records in the data breach. We use the binary cases of each a and b. We use 
the Logisim program to minimize the binary combinations to one case if possible, or as few as 
possible. Finally, we observe how a and b are impacted by the factors of the calculator. All the 
observations are mentioned under each partial cost. In Tables 5.5 and 5.6, xxxx means the four 
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Observations Constant regardless 
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Constant regardless 
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centralized data, the second represents actual fraud, the third represents PCI compliance, and the 
fourth represents action lawsuit. A one or zero in xxxx indicates the transmission impact of the 
factor, while x means the factor does not impact the partial cost. For instance, if a has 1xx0 and 
1xx1, that means that the data is 1xxx - combination just for one value different, and that means it 
is centralized data has full impact on the partial cost. 
Table 5.7: Power relations for the partial costs in the Hub International 
 
From the previous tables and observations, the partial costs equations for both types of data 
breaches are computed using the observation factor change status in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 and the 
amount of change from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The partial costs equations in case of the factor are 
impacted in the following way in Table 5.7: incident investigation cost in equations (5.1) and 
(5.2), customer notification and crisis management cost in equations (5.3) and (5.4), regulatory 
and industry sanctions cost in equations (5.5) and (5.6), and the class action lawsuit cost in 
equations (5.7) and (5.8).  
64		
After we compute each partial cost in the Hub International calculator, the total cost of 
breach and, then, the cost per record can be computed in equations (5.9) and (5.10), respectively. 
The total cost will generally be affected by the type of data breach and the number of affected 












,																																																		 5.10  
where the number of affected records is entered by a user/organization.  
5.4.3.2 Symantec & Ponemon Institute Calculator 
There are 13 factors impacting the cost and probability of a data breach. Four of these factors 
do not directly impact cost or probability in the computation; instead they are used to determine 
the currency of the cost and the number of affected records to be used when the total cost of 
breach is calculated. For most of the rest of factors (six out of nine), there is a correlation between 
the cost per record and the probability, such that the maximum cost per record matches the 
maximum probability and the minimum cost per record matches the minimum probability.  
Ultimately, this calculation represents two costs and one probability: the average cost per 
record (taken by averaging the cost for each of the 9 factors), the average cost per breach 
(obtained by multiplying the average cost per record by the number of affected records), and the 
probability of experiencing a data breach in the next year (obtained the taking the average of the 
probabilities for each of the 9 factors). 
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5.4.3.3 MegaPath & Ponemon Institute Calculator 
The information for this calculator is limited since there are no data about the probabilities or 
the cost per record for each of the 10 factors. Therefore, we do not know exactly how the 
calculator estimates the overall data breach cost as a range from a lower cost to an upper cost of 
data breach. However, it appears that the calculator uses minimum and maximum costs per factor 
and calculates an average to provide the lower and upper costs based on 1,000 affected lost or 
stolen records as mentioned on the result report.  
The media report published by MegaPath Corporation in 2013 mentioned that, in addition to 
calculating breach costs, the calculator could compute the probability of a data breach within the 
next 12 months [92]. To do so, the calculator generates five sub-steps of data breaches: detection 
and escalation, containment and remediation, information loss, business interruption, and 
reputational impact. From our experiments, we could not determine all the previous analyses 
related to the calculation of the data breach cost since we did not have actual data and we did not 
receive a response from MegaPath when we contacted it. 
5.4.3.4 IDentity Theft (IDT911) Calculator 
This calculator is impacted by nine factors. Each factor includes several options for 
estimating cost through a one-part response. The calculator does not include a third-party 
estimation. It is visually organized like a lookup table for different factors or options. The total 
cost is determined by computing the cumulative costs of all factors (equation 5.11). However, 
there is no information on probability or the number of affected records to allow us to calculate 





5.4.3.5 CyberTab Calculator 
As with the other calculators, CyberTab offers no information on the number of affected 
records or the probability of a data breach. This calculator is based on users’ estimates of incident 
response, business expenses and losses, and returns on prevention. Users answer many factors to 
compute different costs. One of the costs is attack or breach cost, which contains the different 
costs when the data breach occurs (equation 5.12). The incident response expenses include 
technology costs and outsourced third-party services costs such as consulting and forensic 
services. The business expenses or costs include c-suite and executives cost, customer services 
cost, credit monitoring cost, legal services cost, crisis management expenses, notifications and 
fines.  Meanwhile, lost business includes reputation loss such as grant loss, lost sales, customer 
loss, and customer retention. 
The CyberTab calculator can be used in one of two modes: a planning mode, which gauges 
the potential cost of an attack to determine and understand the risks and the choices for security 
investment, and reporting mode, which discovers the specific attack costs that remain for a 
company and which assists in benchmarking.  
������	���� = ��������	��������	�������� + ��������	����
+ ����	��������																																																																																																								(5.12) 
5.4.3.6 IBM & Ponemon Institute Calculator 
This calculator is similar to the Symantec and Ponemon Institute calculators since their data 
come from the same source. However, IBM uses newer data from the 2015 Ponemon Institute 
study. IBM incorporates 16 impacted factors, 3 of which have no direct impact on the cost or 
probability of a data breach. These are used to determine the currency of the cost or the number of 
affected records—both of which are used to compute the total cost of the breach. 
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The calculator calculates the average cost per record, the average cost per breach, and the 
likelihood of a data breach in the next 12 months.   
We observed that, for six factors, there is a correlation between the cost per record and the 
probability, such that the maximum cost per record has the maximum probability and the 
minimum cost per record has the minimum probability. In addition, three factors exhibit the 
opposite behavior, such that the maximum cost per record matches the minimum probability and 
the minimum cost per record matches the maximum probability.  
5.5 Proposed Consolidated Model of Data Breach Costs 
After examining the existing calculators, we built the framework for a new model (approach) 
to calculate the total cost of a breach. It incorporates the likelihood of a breach occurring within 
the next 12 months.  
We constructed our model based on the factors that are numerous in different calculators. 
Some of these are significant, and some are not. Thus, we need to know the following 
information:  
§ What factors most impact the computations? 
§ Factor classification: If two factors are in the same category, are they correlated?  
§ Factors: What are the factors’ relationships to cost/probability (linear, non-linear, 
logarithmic, exponential, or power)?  
To achieve the first of these two goals, we use a systematic approach using the following 
steps. The third question requires further research, although this study provided some background. 
First, the factors whose calculators have numbers of cost per breach/record or probability 
(not all calculators calculate probability) are combined in one table. We use the factors of the four 
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calculators only: Hub International/NetDiligence, Symantec/Ponemon, IDT911, and 
IBM/Ponemon. After that, the factors are classified into six categories (Table 5.8).  




TABLE VI.A: FACTORS IMPACTING THE  PARTIAL COSTS BEFORE AND AFTER CONSOLIDATION  










A Total number of affected records? All - X  
Type of data 
breaches 
B1 
What is your organization's industry classification? Symantec 
& IBM 
3.42 X  
B2 
What types of information do your employees handle? Symantec 
& IBM 
4.81 X  
B3 
On whom do you collect sensitive or personally identifiable 
information (PII)? 
IDT911 Redundant, removed. 
B4 
What types of information does the business collect on 
employees? 




C1 Data is in a centralized system/location? Hub Int’l - X  
C2 Actual fraud is expected already? Hub Int’l - X  
C3 Federal class action lawsuit filed? Hub Int’l - X  
C4 
What do you think is the most likely cause of a data breach? Symantec 
& IBM 
2.94 X  
C5 
Do your employees store sensitive data on laptops or on 
removable storage? 
Symantec 1.28  X 
C6 
Is sensitive data encrypted on all laptops or removable storage? Symantec 
& IBM 
3.31 X  
C7 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach caused by a 
third party’s negligence or criminal acts? 
IBM 1.86  X 
C8 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach caused by the 
loss or theft of a laptop, smart phone, tablet, USB thumb drive, 
or other portable data bearing device? 
IBM 1.22  X 
C9 
Did your organization suffer a data breach incident involving 
the loss or theft of 5,000 or more records over the past 24 
months? 
IBM 1.84  X 
C10 
Did your organization ever suffer a data breach incident that 
was publicly disclosed to the media, advocates, and/or 
regulators? 
IBM 1.76  X 
C11 
Who has access to sensitive information on employees, 
customers, and patients? 
IDT911 -  X 
C12 How does the business store information? (paper or electronic) IDT911 -  X 
C13 
How does the business store information? (on-site, off-site, 
cloud) 
IDT911 Redundant, removed. 
C14 
Is document, email, and device/hard drive encryption used to 
protect sensitive electronic information about employees, 
customers, and/or patients during transmission, storage, and 
retrieval of data? 
IDT911 Redundant, removed. 
C15 
How long does the business keep/retain sensitive information 
pertaining to employees, customers, and patients? 
IDT911 - X  
C16 








D1 Number of Years for credit monitoring? Hub Int’l - X  
D2 
What is the global headcount of your organization? Symantec 
& IBM 
1.93 X  
D3 
What is the global footprint of your organization? Symantec 
& IBM 
1.62  X 
D4 
Does your organization have a dedicated information security 
leader, such as a chief information security officer (CISO)? 
Symantec 
& IBM 
1.69  X 
D5 
Is your organization's business continuity management team 
involved in the data breach incident response process? 
IBM 1.73 X  
D6 
Approximately how many employee records do you store and 
retain that contain social security numbers, account numbers, 
medical records information, and/or other personal 
information? 
IDT911 -  X 
D7 
How many states does the business have employees, 
customers, and patients in? 
IDT911 -  X 
Regulatory and 
sanction cost 
E Is PCI compliance an issue? Hub Int’l - X  
Lawsuit cost 
F1 
Actual fraud is expected already? (This factor impacts again 
here) 
Hub Int’l - X  
F2 
Federal class action lawsuit filed? (This factor impacts again 
here) 
Hub Int’l - X  
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Second, all the repeated/correlated factors should be removed (such as items B3 and B4 in 
Table 5.8) after determining that the factors are closely related to others (items B1 and B2). We 
chose the new costs data like IBM, which uses cost per record, not like IDT911. In addition, 
items C13 and C14 are removed since there are similar to items C5 and C6, and we use them 
because we use the newer data and the factors provide more options. 
Third, the type of data breach affects all the partial costs except the security upgrade. Thus, 
the two factors (B1 and B2) are significant.  
The significance of a factor is determined using this approach:   
(1) For each partial cost classification: make the average and standard deviation (STDEV) for 
all the averages of ratio for the cost and probability (max cost / min cost) and (max probability / 
min probability). However, we tested IDT911 alone since its cost is not per record.  
(2) Choose significant factor if it is bigger than the following equation that distributes data 
normally: (average cost ratio or average probability ratio + 0.5 X STDEV).  
(3) Choose insignificant factors if they are smaller than the following equation: average cost 
ratio or average probability ratio - 0.5 X STDEV (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9: Identifying the significant factors for some categories in the consolidated model 
 
  (6) Then, we combine formulas of each type of data Below, the different cost components are described 
TABLE VI.B: IDENTIFYING THE SIGNIFICANT FACTORS FOR SOME CATEGORIES IN THE CONSOLIDATED MODEL 
Variation Attributes	






















Avg.= 1.8 2.29 6.33	 1.46	 1.4	 10	 1.35	 1.29	
STDEV= 0 0.54 5.13	 0.34	 0.24	 0	 0.12	 0.06	
Avg. + 0.5 * STDEV = 1.8 2.56 8.9	 1.63	 1.52	 10	 1.41	 1.32	
Avg. - 0.5 * STDEV = 1.8 2.02 3.77	 1.29	 1.28	 10	 1.29	 1.26	
Significant factor >1.8 >2.56 >8.9	 >1.63	 >1.52	 >10	 >1.41	 >1.32	
Insignificant factor <1.8 <2.02 <3.77	 <1.29	 <1.28	 <10	 <1.29	 <1.26	
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(4) Between them: use equation (5.13) to compute the risk scores for the calculators [95] 
(Table 5.8). 
��������	���� = ����	��������	�����ℎ	����	�	 
�����������	��	�ℎ����	����	��������	�����ℎ	���ℎ��	�	����																																														(5.13) 
 
(5) Use our judgment to determine which factor is significant (high risk) to remain and 
insignificant (low risk) to remove. That judgment is based on comparison between risk values in 
the same partial cost category. For instance, we determine each factor in incident investigation 
classification, and those with a risk score less than 2 are insignificant while those with a score 
higher than 2 are significant factors. While all factors in crisis management had a risk score under 
2, we chose two factors as significant factors based on our subjective consideration since these 
factors were definitely important according to the cost ratio and probability ratio.   
(6) Any insignificant should be removed.  
(7) All the factors of Hub International are considered directly significant, and they were not 
tested in the previous steps because they are essential factors of one of the main sources of our 
model.  
(8) For the factors of IDT911, any factor that has an average cost ratio larger than 8.9/10 and 
that we think is useful in our model is considered significant. There is no risk score since there is 
no probability for these factors.  
Based on our study of existing approaches, we build a comprehensive model that 
incorporates all the factors affecting the cost while attempting to simplify the approach, as 










After taking into consideration the significant factors that impact data breach risks from all 
the available data breach calculators in the previous chapter, it is evident that a quantitative model 
that takes a systematic approach for total cost based on number of records is required. That model 
should include the concept of economy of scale to illustrate why the data breach cost per record 
figure is misleading. In addition, a quantitative model for probability of a breach in the next year 
is important part during estimation of data breach risk.  
6.2 Applicability of Existing Models 
As discussed in a previous chapter, there exit two major computational models with their 
own data sources: Ponemon, which created calculators with sponsorships from Symantac (2010), 
Megapath (2013), and IBM (2014), and NetDiligence, which created the Hub International 
calculator (2012) and contributed to the Verizon report. There have been no critical studies of the 
two approaches. This study presents a preliminary comparison using detailed data from two recent 
widely discussed breaches: 2013 Target breach and 2014 Home Depot breach (Tables 6.1 and 
6.2). We also examine the recent claims made by Jay Jacobs of Verizon, who collaborated with 
NetDiligence [104] who has been critical of the computations model used by Ponemon because 
the Ponemon approach yields a cost per record that he believes is too high.  
The difference between the two models is readily illustrated using the average cost/record 
implicit in the two approaches. Table 6.3 gives the cost per record according to the 2015 Ponemon 
study, which comes out to be about $217. Table 6.4 gives the cost per record as computed by our 
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analysis for Hub International/NetDiligence (regardless the average static loss), which is 
remarkably different: $12.57 for credit cards and $8.58 for personal information. The 2015 
Verizon Data Beach Investigations Report (DBIR) finds the average cost per record to be $0.58 
[96] by applying the Ponemon formula (all breach costs divided by compromised records: $400 
million / 700 million records= $0.58). The two to three orders of magnitude difference raises 
several questions.  
Table 6.1: Target data breach actual reported costs 
 
 
Table 6.2: Home Depot data breach actual reported costs 
 
  Both organizations use significantly large and diverse data sets. Ponemon collected data 
from more than 1600 companies in several countries. NetDiligence data from the 2015 Verizon 
(DBIR) [96] uses data from 191 cyber insurance payouts.  
We can compare the cost/record with the now well-known numbers for the Target and the 
Home Depot breaches, which come out to $6.30 and $1.13 per record, respectively (Tables 6.1, 
6.2). The sources for these numbers are well documented. Target Brands Inc. had a major incident 
of data breach on December 2013 involving 40 million credit and debit card records [97]. The 
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total estimation of the data breach was about $252 million, as shown in Table 6.1, which uses 
Target’s financial statements [98, 99]. These numbers are closer to the NetDiligence numbers. 
The results are similar to the Hub International calculation (Table 6.3) if we exclude the expected 
lawsuit cost ($12.57 – $7.09 = $5.48) since a lawsuit has not yet occurred. The cost per record in 
this breach is not at all close to Ponemon’s cost per record. 
The other notable example is that of the Home Depot data breach in 2014, which involved 56 
million customer payment cards [97]. The available information about the cost of this breach is 
given in Table 6.2 [100, 101]. We found that the cost per card was $63m/56m = $1.13. This cost 
is much lower than` what would be estimated using the Ponemon calculators, and it is in fact 
closer to the Hub International estimate. 
Table 6.3: Average cost per record according to Ponemon Study: 2015 cost of data breach in 
United States 
 







There are two apparent sources of discrepancy: 
1. What the cost includes: Ponemon costs include intangible costs, such as reputation loss 
and its impact on business loss. NetDiligence does not include these costs. In addition, 
NetDiligence uses insurance claims as a measure of the costs. It has been argued that the 
insurance claims represent only the costs covered by insurance purchased [102]. Still, the 
insurance coverage should be of the same order of magnitude as the actual cost. The reputation 
loss cost can be hard to measure. Recent attempts to measure it using stock price as a metric 
appears to suggest that it may be minimal in many cases, and the effect may be masked by more 
significant causes in the stock price movement. 
2. The sizes of the breaches: The major contributor to the cost per record differences is 
probably the fact that overall cost is not likely to be proportional to the number of records 
involved. The average number of records used in the 2015 Ponemon study was 28,070 and not in 
excess of 100,000 records in general, while the NetDiligence data involves breaches with a much 
higher number of records, with the average breach involving 3,166,600 records [103].  There are 
two reasons: some data breach costs are relatively fixed and are independent of the number of 
records. Thus, the cost per record would be lower with a larger number of records. Even when the 
cost does go up with the number of records, economics of scale enters the picture. An 
organization with a large number of records breaches should be able to handle them more cost 
effectively and should be able to negotiate better rates from organizations providing recovery 
services. The 2015 Verizon report points out that for 100 lost records, the average cost per record 
was $254 since the expected breach cost is $25,445, but for the loss of 100 million records, the 
cost was only $0.09/record since $9 million is the expected breach cost [96]. Thus, cost per record 
is a misleading metric. 
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Our analysis of the Hub International calculator, which uses the data breach cost data from 
NetDiligence, suggests that it assumes a linear trend. On the other hand, the calculators that 
depend on the Ponemon data, where the number of breaches do not exceed 100,000 records, are 
not linear [104]. 
We thus propose to a model that is non-linear relative to the number of records since a linear 
model implies that there is a cost per record that is meaningful.    
6.3 Economy of Scale 
Since the cost per record is misleading when it comes to estimating the data breach cost, the 
economy of scale concept will assist in making the cost per record inconstant instead of the 
constant cost per record that is obtained by dividing the total breach cost by the total breach size. 
Therefore, using the economy of scale is important in order to remove the correlation between the 
big breach cost and breach size and ensure that the relationship relies not only on the cost per 
record factor only but also on other factors.  
The current issue is that the total breach cost increases when the size of the data breach 
increases. To investigate this issue, the concept of economy of scale is needed for analysis, along 
with actual data. This concept is defined as a decrease in the average long-term costs resulting 
from an increase in the size of the operating unit [105]. The actual data that identifies that concept 
is taken from the following reports: Ponemon 2013 [106], Ponemon 2014 [107], and 
Verizon/NetDiligence [96] (we used a software to digitize a plot in Verizon report).  Therefore, 
we present two hypotheses:  
(1) The overall cost rises with breach size.  
(2) For larger breaches, the breach cost per record will decline. Thus, the overall 
breach cost will rise less than linearly. 
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To test these hypotheses, we plot the data from the three datasets as given by Figures (6.1, 
6.2, and 6.3). The two hypotheses are supported by both the Ponemon and the 
Verizon/NetDiligence data sets. The per-record cost declines as the size of the data breach 
increases. Table 6.5 gives the results of the regression. A residual analysis suggests that the trend 
appears to change slightly for record sizes greater than about 25,000. That suggests the model 
may be amenable to further refinement. Perhaps a piecewise regression may yield better accuracy, 
which may be addressed in future research. It is notable that while the parameter values for the 
Ponemon data sets are in the same range, the values are different for the Verizon/NetDiligence 
data. The reason is that the two data collection approaches are different.  The 
Verizon/NetDiligence data is based on insurance payments, while the Ponemon data includes 
more complete costs such as opportunity costs. 
 








Figure 6.3: Verizon 2015 data -the claim amount vs breach size (ranges from single digits to 108 
million records) 
 
Since there are several factors that impact the overall breach cost, it is to be expected that 
there would be significant variation that is not explained by breach size alone. For very small 
breaches, the fixed costs would dominate, and thus the trend would not be clearly visible.   
Based on the available data sets, a model of the total breach cost after incorporating economy 
of scale can be formulated as given in equation (6.1): 
�����	������	���� = �	 ∗ 	����	^	�																																																																																																(6.1) 
 
In this equation, a and b are applicable parameters, and size refers to breach sizes bigger than 
or equal to 1000 records. (This equation is not applicable in cases where a small number of 
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records are affected.)  Then, the cost per record after incorporating economy of scale is obtained 
by dividing the previous equation by breach size as in the equation (6.2): 
 
����	���	������ = �	 ∗ 	(����)	^	(� − 1)																																																																																				(6.2) 
 
Table 6.5 gives the values of the two parameters for the Ponemon 2013, Ponemon 2014, and 
NetDiligence data. As observed above, the parameter values for the two Ponemon data sets are 
close, suggesting that the two data sets, while distinct, were collected using the same approach. 
The NetDiligence data yields somewhat different values, which is likely to be the result of the fact 
that their numbers were collected differently. However, the two hypotheses mentioned above are 
both supported by the three data sets. The parameter values in equation (6.2) should conform with 
how the numbers are to be interpreted. 
Table 6.5: The breach cost/payout regression models for the three datasets 
 
6.4 A Comprehensive Cost Computation Model 
Figure 6.4 presents a comprehensive model for the cost of a breach and hence the annual 
security cost. It incorporates the concepts from the existing computational models. Ponemon 
Institute terms some data breach costs direct, meaning that they require direct financial expenses, 
while indirect costs include the time, effort, and other. The total cost for a breach includes five 
partial costs: incident investigation, crisis management, regulatory and industry sanctions related 
to governmental procedures, class action lawsuit, and opportunity cost.  
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The total security cost consists of two components: the total cost directly attributable to a 
data breach and the cost of security maintenance and upgrade, which would be necessary even if 
the breach had not occurred. The two costs contribute to the expected annual security cost 
(equation 6.3) for an organization that is affected by a security data breach.  
��������	������	��������	���� = Annual	expected	costs	due	to	breaches +
Costs	regardless	of	any	breaches																																																																																																					(6.3)       
 
The expected annual cost because of possible data breaches would depend on the likelihood 





The expected costs due to breach could cover the past data breach that occurred or the data 
breach that could occur in the future. In the past breach, the data breach probability will be 1 and 
the actual cost of data breach will compute normally. But, for the future data breach, the data 
breach probability will be less than 1. 
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Figure 6.4. Overall risk evaluation model (Data breach cost and probability) 
 
6.4.1 Compiled Cost Data 
As mentioned in a chapter (5), we analyzed the available calculators that estimate data breach 
risks. We studied the Hub International Calculator to collect actual data such as a and b 
parameters by using the power regression equations that computed partial costs, but did not 
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calculate the probability. For IDT911’s calculator, the presented costs for each option have been 
recorded in the tables below. Those costs are part of the total breach cost, but such a small figure 
may not be the appropriate method for estimation of breach cost. With the IBM/Ponemon 
calculator, the details of costs per records and the probability of breach occurrence within next 12 
months are sent out via email after filling out a survey. IBM/Ponemon does not publish how it 
estimates each cost per record for each option that is chosen for the questions (factors). Our model 
is based on the numbers of the Hub International calculator, since it was obtained by our analysis, 
and the IBM/Ponemon calculator provides the multiplier factors values that are represent the 
variation between options. The interface, a, b, cost per record, partial cost per breach, and the 
probability are shown in Table (6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11).  
Only two types of data breach are used: Personal Health information (PHI) and Social 
Security Number (SSN), and Credit Cards (CC).  
We ignore three factors during estimation of partial costs per record for several reasons. For 
instance, factor 3 is ignored, since we think that its data about costs and probability is 
redundant/overlapped with factor 2, which regards industry classification. In addition, we ignore 
factor 10 in incident investigation cost classification during the estimation of that cost because the 
estimation of the breach cost is small and might be insignificant, but we use this factor when we 
compute the cost per record (CPR). Moreover, factor 12 is redundant, as we believe it is similar to 
factor 1. Therefore, we ignore it, because its impact of more headcount will equal the impact of 
more breach size.   
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Table 6.6: First factor to enter the size of breach that impacts on the data breach cost 
 
 
Table 6.7: The data breach cost and the probability for the factors of data breach types 
 
 




Table 6.9: The data breach cost and the probability for crisis management cost 
 
 
Table 6.10: The parameters of a and b for regulatory and industry sanctions cost 
 
 
Table 6.11: The parameters of a and b for class action lawsuit cost 
 
Below, the different cost components are described briefly.  
6.4.2 Security costs due to data breach 
There are several partial costs that contribute to the total cost per breach. These partial costs 
are generally affected by the number of records that might be impacted by the breach as well as 
the data breach type. The partial costs per record equations are presented after incorporating the 
economy of scale. Then, we can obtain the partial cost per breach by multiplying the cost per 
record with breach size.  
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The partial costs include the following: 
6.4.2.1 Incident investigation cost  
The cost of incident investigation includes costs of all the activities that assist the 
organization to discover the data breach [108]. For example, forensic, investigation, and 
consulting services, assessment and audit services, and technology staff cost. We use the factors’ 
values to note the variation between options in the data of IBM/Ponemon. We discuss more about 
that in the section on Computation of Factors. The equation that estimates the incident 
investigation cost is show in (6.5):  
 
Investigation cost per record =  
                             [a*(size)^(b-1) for factors 4,5,6] * Fbreach_cause * Fencryption * Fprivacy               (6.5)  
Where the values of a, b, and the cost per record can use them from Table 6.8. In addition, 
the factors that use in this equation are analysis as the follows: 
Cost factor: Data Breach Causes Fbreach_cause:  
The causes that lead to data breach have different impacts on the cost of data breach.  Some 
causes have minimal impact on the cost and some have a greater impact. Table 6.12 is 
represented the values of this factor. 






Cost factor: Sensitive Data Encryption Fencryption: 
The encryption of sensitive data on laptops or removable storage (if applicable) costs the 
organization less money if the organization has a data breach, but more money if the data is not 
encrypted. The values for this factor are shown in Table 6.13.    
Table 6.13: Cost factor - Sensitive data encryption Fencryption 
 
Cost factor: Organization’s Privacy Fprivacy:  
The privacy and the protection of data have a huge effect on the data breach cost based on if 
they are applied or not. The factor values are shown in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14: Cost factor - Organization’s Privacy Fprivacy 
 
6.4.2.2 Crisis management cost 
Crisis management refers to the activities that allow the company to inform the public that 
personal information has been lost or stolen [108] and manage the impact of the current data 
breach. It also includes notification activities, credit monitoring and reissuing credit cards (if any). 
Note that the cost of reissuing the cards may be borne by the issuing bank and not the 
86		
organization experiencing the breach (this may however change because of recent changes in the 
rules). The equation that estimates the crisis management cost is show in (6.6): 
 
Crisis Management Cost per Record = [a * (size) ^ (b-1) for factor 11] * FBCM                  (6.6) 
 
Where the values of a, and b can use them from Table 6.9. In addition, the factor values of 
the team of business continuity management are discussed as the following: 
Cost factor: Business Continuity Management Team FBCM:  
This team usually knows to detect the data security risk in the organization and has an 
emergency plan to deal with a potential breach. Therefore, finding this team in the organization 
will reduce the data breach cost. Table 6.15 shows the values of these factors.  
Table 6.15: Cost factor - Business continuity management team FBCM 
 
6.4.2.3 Regulatory and industry sanctions cost 
This cost depends on the PCI compliance. If the organization is not compliant, fines and 
sanctions may be imposed on it. The equation that estimates the regulatory and industry sanctions 
cost is show in (6.7): 
Sanctions cost per record = a * (size) ^ (b-1) for factor 14                                                (6.7) 
 
Where the values of a and b can use them from Table 6.10. 
6.4.2.4 Class action lawsuit cost 
If a federal class action lawsuit is filed, the organization will incur the costs for litigation, 
legal defense, and damages. The equation that estimates the class action lawsuit cost is show in 
(6.8): 
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Class Action Lawsuit Cost per record= a * (size) ^ (b-1) for factor 15 and 16             (6.8) 
Where the values of a and b can use them from Table 6.11. 
6.4.2.5 Opportunity cost 
These are also known as lost business costs that result from lost business opportunities and 
reputation after a data breach has been reported to victims and publicly in the media [108]. This 
can be hard to evaluate because assessing the opportunity loss resulting specifically from the 
breach can be difficult.  
It has been argued that the impact of a breach would be reflected in the stock price of the 
organization. While some earlier studies suggested that there is in fact a significant impact on 
stock price, a more recent study has questioned this impact. This could be due to the perception 
that data breaches are common [109]. The relative impact on the stock price depends on the 
relation between the total data breach cost and the company’s annual revenue. If the breach cost is 
low, the breach itself will have little impact on stock prices.  
6.4.3 Security costs Regardless of Data Breach 
All organizations take measures to reduce the possibility of data breaches. These depend on 
the size of the organization and perceived security risks.  
These costs include recurring costs of the security measures and security upgrades that may 
be needed. Upgrading means protecting the organization against the damage or loss of 
information by bridging existing security gaps. Such security upgrades reduce the likelihood of a 
data breach and hence the cost of cyber insurance at the same time.  
Generally, it is hard to find information on the costs of security upgrades since the upgrades 
occur internally and organizations do not publish the details. Therefore, creating a preliminary 
economics model to estimate the security upgrade cost for an organization remains an open 
problem. Some information on upgrade costs can be found in articles that are occasionally 
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published. For instance, LinkedIn spent between $2–3 million in 2012 to prevent password theft 
[110]. 
For relatively small organization departments, these costs may be difficult to quantify, as 
each staff member spends time, which may be difficult to measure, participating in activities such 
as installing security patches, configuring systems and applications to achieve better security, and 
managing system behavior in response to a security breach.  
Equation (6.9) shows how to compute the elements that comprise security upgrade costs. 
 
����	����������	��	����	������ = 
Security	Maintance	Cost + Security	Upgrade	Cost + insurance	premium																								(6.9)		 
 
6.4.4 Cyber Liability Insurance Coverage 
Cyber liability insurance is also known as data breach insurance. It provides the required 
coverage after the data breach occurred and the data loss. This coverage by insurance companies 
is partial.  
In the current days, the demand of cyber insurance has increase since the data breaches 
number has increased also [108]. Therefore, markets have a lot of cyber insurance companies 
that coverage the 1st party costs and 3rd party costs of data breach. The cyber insurance is 
becoming the main element during the cyber risk management especially through the data breach 
risks. We think that cyber insurance is an essential part of data breach incident response plan that 
assist to minimize the organization’s damage, liability, and performance. We can consider that 
cyber insurance can coverage any business loss and reduce the impacts of it. The cost of cyber 
insurance and its coverage vary depending on how the cost is accounted for by the organization’s 
agenda. Sometimes, the insurance cost is considered a security cost, and other times it is simply 
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considered a cost of doing business.  Insurance coverage needs further analysis and investigation 
in the future.  
6.4.5 Computation of Factors 
To calculate all the related data breach and security costs, and the probability, we use the 
available data from the IBM/Ponemon calculator that is shown in Tables (6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 
and 6.11) in order to make the equations of our model to compute the data breach risk. 
Therefore, the model of data breach cost per record and the probability will use the method of 
“multiplicative model” similar to the other quantitative models such as the defect density models 
by Chulani and Boehm [111] and Malaiya and Denton [112], software cost estimation model by 
Barry Boehm [113], and MIL-HDBK-217 Chip failure rate model [114]. The model of the cost 
per record is shown in equation (6.10):   
 
Cost per record for type i (CPR)=  Fcountry * FIndustry * Fduration (Σ four partial costs per record: 
incident investigate, crisis management, regulatory and industry sanctions, class action lawsuit)                                                  
(6.10) 
Where the three factors are the country of organization that had a data breach Fcountry, the 
organization’s industry classification FIndustry, and the duration that the business keeps the 
sensitive information of employees, customers and patients Fduration. These factors will be 
multiplied by the cost per record of the four partial costs that include incident investigation, crisis 
management, regulatory and industry sanctions, and class action lawsuit. Each factor has a 
default value that is equal to one. The sub-models for each factor are proposed as the following: 
Cost factor: Organization’s Country Fcountry 
Table 6.16 presents 11 countries whose organizations have a data breach in one of them. 
This factor is not determined as a significant factor in our approach, but we believe that the 
country has a large impact on the costs per record mentioned in IBM/Ponemon 2015 Global 
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analysis [77].   We use the US as the default. Then, we use weighted cost/factor for the rest of the 
countries based on the cost per record for the US, which is $217.  
Table 6.16: Cost factor - Organization’s Country Fcountry 
 
Cost factor: Organization’s Industry Classification FIndustry  
This factor takes into account the different types of industry classifications. Some of the 
classifications have a bigger effect on the cost per record than others. The values of the factor of 
industry classifications are shown in Table 6.17, and the default value is one.  




Cost factor: Sensitive Information Keeping Fduration   
The business keeps some information about their employees, customers, and patients for 
different lengths of time. These times will cost the organizations depending on the length of the 
keeping time. We determine how many months approximately are in each duration. The durations 
are as follows: 3, 12, 48, 72. Then, we make 48 months as the default one. After that, we plot the 
months with cost, make a trend line, and obtain the equation: y=37 * months + 317. In addition, 
we normalize that equation by dividing all values by 2000, which is the cost of 48 months (the 
default). The equation becomes: y= 0.0185 * months + 0.158. The values of a factor are found by 
dividing the cost of each duration by 2000 that is the cost of 48 months. The values are presented 
in Table 6.18.  
Table 6.18: Cost factor - Sensitive information keeping Fduration 
 
After calculation of the cost per record, the total cost due to breach can be computed by 
multiplication of the cost per record by the number of affected records as shown in equation 
(6.11):  
 
Total cost due to breach for type i = Cost per records for type i * Breach size                    (6.11) 
 
6.5 Modeling Data Breach Probability  
The likelihood of data breach for an organization can depend on factors that may be termed 
internal [vulnerabilities (if any) that could lead to a breach and whether they are still available, 
which would imply that there is insufficient security], external (attacker motivation and 
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capabilities), or Bayesian (past breaches may imply weaker security unless security is 
significantly upgraded because of a breach) (Figure 6.4).  
It should be noted that some of the factors considered by the Ponemon Institute to impact the 
cost can be considered as factors impacting the probability, such as BCM team and data 
encryption.  
There are two main factors to predict the data breach probability: number of affected records 
lost or stolen, and industry classification of organizations that is considered a factor under the 
classification of data types of breach [77]. From the 2015 Ponemon report [77], we used a 
software to extract some data.  The probability is computed by size of data breach and by country 
as in Figures (6.5 and 6.6). The expression for the probability of data breach based on the breach 
size given in the equation (6.12) is based on the data points in Figure (6.5) using a trend line for 
the data.  
The data probability over a 12 month period (y) = α e
-βx                  
(6.12) 
Where: α = 0.4405,  β = 4E-05, and x the breach size. After studying the probability of data 
breach, we found that most researchers estimate the probability based on limited methods, such as 
survey and collecting experts’ opinions like the Ponemon estimation, using the dataset of Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) [79] between 2005 to 2014 to predict the probability of some event 
for the next year [115].  In addition, there are some researchers who do not explain how to 




Figure 6.5: Data breach probability based on the breach size (Ponemon data 2015) [77] 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Data breach probability by country (Ponemon data 2015) [77] 
However, cost and probability of data breach of Ponemon calculators (Symantec and IBM) 
use a survey (questions or factors) to examine the cost and probability incurred by organizations 
after experiencing data breach incidents. Therefore, we do not expect that the calculators will 
estimate the cost and probability for the organizations that do not face any data breaches 
beforehand. Equation (6.13) is represented by the data breach probability for the organization in 
next 12 months: 
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The Probability of a breach of data type i for next 12 months =  
                       Fcountry * FBCM * Findustry * Fbreach_cause * Fencryption * Fprivacy * α e
-βx                  (6.13) 
 
Where α = 0.4405,  β = 4E-05, x the breach size, the six factors are the country of 
organization that had a data breach Fcountry, the organization’s business continuity management 
team is involved in the data breach incident response process FBCM, the organization’s industry 
classification FIndustry, and the most likely cause of a data breach Fbreach_cause, the sensitive data 
encrypted on al laptops or removable storage Fencryption, the organization’s privacy and 
availability of data protection program Fprivacy. The factors are multiplied with the probability 
(equation 6.12). Generally, each factor has a default value that is equal to one at the beginning.   
The sub-models for each factor have proposed as the following:  
Probability factor: Organization’s Country Fcountry 
As the data breach cost, the probability is impacted by the different countries of the 
organizations that have the breach experience. The data of the probability based on the country is 
taken from the 2015 Ponemon report [77].  We make the US the default. Then, we use a weighted 
factor for the rest countries based on the probability for US that is 0.22%, as presented in Table 
6.19.  
Table 6.19: Probability factor - Organization’s Country Fcountry 
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Probability factor: Business Continuity Management Team FBCM 
This factor is essential to identify the potential threat that faces the organizations and the 
impacts that come from these threats. Therefore, this factor has different impacts based on 
whether or not the team is involved in the data breach incident response plan or not. Table 6.20 
shows the values of these factors.  
Table 6.20: Probability factor - Business continuity management team FBCM 
 
Probability factor: Organization’s Industry Classification FIndustry 
The different industry classifications also making for different probabilities of data breach, 
as well as the cost of data breach. The factor values are shown in Table 6.21. 
Table 6.21: Probability factor - Organization’s Industry classification FIndustry 
 
Probability factor: Data Breach Causes Fbreach_cause 
The probability of data breach varies based on the reason that the data is breached. Table 
6.22 shows the values of this factor. 
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Table 6.22: Probability factor - Data breach causes Fbreach_cause 
 
Probability factor: Sensitive Data Encryption Fencryption 
If the sensitive data on the laptops or removable storage is encrypted (if applicable), that 
lowers the probability of data breach compared to data that is not encrypted. The values of this 
factor are presented in Table 6.23.    
Table 6.23: Probability factor - Sensitive data encryption Fencryption 
 
Probability factor: Organization’s Privacy Fprivacy 
Table 6.24 shows this factor’s values. The forms of applied privacy in an organization will 
impact data breach probabilities. Therefore, if the organization has strict privacy, the probability 
of data breach is less. Likewise, if the data has perfect protection, the lower the probability for 
the data to be breached.  
Table 6.24: Probability factor - Organization’s Privacy Fprivacy 
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6.6 Challenges and Limitations 
Often the companies that have encountered data breaches do not publish details on the real 
numbers of damage costs, although some numbers do emerge in reports. The Ponemon Institute 
and NetDiligence collect proprietary data and publish an annual summary. Therefore, our 
analysis has focused on the reports they have published as well as news reports. The data breach 
cost estimates—and what those estimates include—vary from one source to another. We have 
tried to resolve and possibly explain the apparent differences. We develop computational 
components of our model to ensure that it makes realistic assumptions backed by data from 
multiple sources.    
The data breach cost calculators represent a major first step towards systematic estimation 
of breach costs. However, they are mainly intended for online estimation for specific cases only 
and may be intended to promote the security-related services offered. In some cases, we need to 
obtain the computational results by filling the calculator inputs at various steps, and the 
calculator then sends the results back by email. The methodology used for computations is not 
disclosed. Most of the calculators provide the cost per breach only for specifically chosen values 
for a factor. The values returned are often not broken into cost components for example, the Hub 
International calculator only generates the cost per breach. Furthermore, some of the calculators 
do not use any underlying data for costs of security breaches, such as CyberTab, where users 
need to enter the cost of data breaches themselves to calculate the cost. Thus, some of the 
calculators provide little insight that would allow the construction of an accurate model for data 
breach costs.  
Chapter 7 
 




This dissertation has focused mainly on the software vulnerabilities markets, their 
discoverers, and their potential risks regarding security and economics. We analyze the 
current types of vulnerability markets, the main players of these markets, and how the 
vulnerability markets produce huge impacts on security and economics in the same time. In 
addition, we identify the significant factors that impact the risk of data breaches, and we 
estimate the cost and probability of a data breach for any organization that has faced a 
cybercrime. We have faced several challenges and limitations during our research and 
results, which is natural in many areas, but the important point is how to overcome these 
challenges to expand our research in the future.  
7.1 Research Challenges  
Studying vulnerability markets is still a new direction in the software vulnerability field. 
Therefore, there are not many academic references or specific articles in newspapers that 
concentrate on the vulnerability markets and their transactions. In addition, there is not yet 
enough data to start the development of key hypotheses regarding the mechanics of multiple 
vulnerability markets. Additionally, datasets that contain vulnerability market transaction 
data are not available, missing, or available only to large software companies, not for 
academic organizations. Specifically, for some vulnerability markets, such as black markets, 
the transactions between sellers and buyers are unknown.    
However, security data breach does not pay attention a lot by the academic researches. 





data breach of organizations or countries. Therefore, the academic references are not 
available much about the topic of data breach risks.  Moreover, the data of security breach is 
too limited. For instance, most of the companies that have encountered data breaches do not 
publish details on the real numbers of damage costs, although some numbers do emerge in 
reports. Our estimation model mainly focusses on different sources of data such as Ponemon 
Institute and NetDiligence. They collect proprietary data and publish annual reports. 
Therefore, our analysis accuracy depends on the accuracy of these two reports.  
7.2 Summary and Conclusions 
In our work, we study and analyze several topics related to the software vulnerability 
markets, whether inside these markets or risks produced from some types of markets if 
vulnerabilities have been sold and exploited.  
We have examined the motivation and methods of vulnerability discoverers by studying 
the motivation and the methods of discoverers and the vulnerability market.  The most 
successful vulnerability discoverers are identified, and their motivation and techniques have 
been examined. 
While vulnerability discoverers use some tools— including those that they have 
developed themselves—they rely on their expertise and insight to a considerable extent.  It 
must be kept in mind that tools for finding known vulnerabilities are completely different, 
and are not of use for discovering new vulnerabilities.  
We find that a large fraction of the discoverers is from outside of the software 
development organizations, and their key motivation is a monetary reward.  The 





legitimate markets.  Reward programs and contract-based software review services are the 
major components of the legitimate markets.  Organizations that act as vulnerability brokers 
may deal in either the legitimate or the black market.  The vulnerability discoverers 
acknowledge that the black markets can often be attractive.  Our work suggests that 
government agencies may make up a significant part of the black market buyers.  
Furthermore, we have identified multiple vulnerability markets where the exchange 
between the discoverers and the buyers of the vulnerabilities takes place. We find that 
legitimate vulnerability markets and illegitimate markets. We believe that all legitimate 
markets should be regulated to be more attractive for vulnerability discoverers than 
illegitimate markets since they are providing a good income for discoverers, but produce 
many risk against the economy and society because the buyers in most cases have special 
agendas and they are not trusted people or organizations.  
However, the potential cost of information loss to businesses and society is increasing 
yearly. Therefore, there is a need for an economic model to calculate the costs related to data 
breach incidents with strong predictive capabilities. 
We examine the current state of existing approaches, which often disagree in terms of 
methodologies and results. We collected all calculators’ factors that can impact on the cost of 
data breach or the probability. Then, we choose the significant factors and merge/remove the 
redundant factors or insignificant based on scientific methodology.  
After that, we build an open quantitative model of data breach costs and probability that 
can be explained and calibrated using existing data as well as newer data as it becomes 





identification of the fixed and variable costs. The model is validated using actual data. Such a 
model is allowing more accurate estimation of the economic risks, allowing both software 
vendors and users to optimally invest in security. The computation of probability, which is 
provided by some calculators, is explored in some detail.  
7.3 Future Work 
The future work will continue to investigate and study the reasons that make the 
vulnerability markets are not fully organized, which result in risks that harm economies or 
societies. 
For the vulnerability markets, we should continue to improve our understanding of the 
factors that affect the vulnerability markets and the main players in them. Moreover, we must 
organize these markets and encourage the players in them to enter legitimate markets and 
reduce their use of illegitimate markets. This will assist in minimizing the security and 
economic risks. Therefore, our next work should be expanded further by looking at a larger 
number of individual discoverers. There is a need to study the legitimate and the black 
markets so that the processes can be modeled accurately.    Because this is a dynamically 
changing field, studies such as this need to be repeated in order to see if there are any 
observable trends in terms of the vulnerabilities that end up in the legitimate and black 
market periodically, and the subsequent risks to society. Furthermore, our work needs for 
further examination of the markets in more detail. There is a need to collect data about the 
transactions in the regulated and the unregulated markets so that the processes can be 





For the risk assessment model of data breach, we need to review the data breach factors 
that impact the risk year by year and compare our model with the actual data breach cost or 
probability to ensure that our risk model is improved since there are no perfect/accurate 
model to estimate the data breach risks, but there is a good or better model when we compare 
several model in the same criteria.  
We believe some issues should be investigated immediately; some ideas should be 
launched in the near future to mitigate vulnerability risks. For example, we need to create 
new vulnerability markets that are suitable for the different types of vulnerability discoverers. 
These markets should be legitimate, attractive, and easy to deal with so they are a good 
income source for both sellers and buyers. In addition, studying the rewards buyers give to 
sellers should be reasonable, depending on supply and demand and other commercial market 
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